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Until he extends the circle of his compassion to
all living things, man will not himself find peace.
- Albert Schweitzer'
We hear quite a bit about corporate social responsibility in our economy.
The emphasis in these matters is upon the corporation's treatment of its customers
in terms of financial fairness and personal well-being. Few people can be un-
familiar with the Pinto scenario 2 (which culminated in the Ford Motor Com-
pany's being tried for murder and acquitted in 1978) or the Dalkon Shield debacle
(which resulted in many cases of death, stillbirth, sterilization, and other such
tragedies) .3 These cases touch directly upon the issue of corporate responsibility
for the consumers' well-being.
Cases involving the fiscal misconduct of corporations are always with us.
The EF. Hutton affair 4 involving "creative" banking, and the Boesky insider-
trading incident,5 were simply the latest in a history-rich tradition of commer-
*B.S.B.A., University of Florida (1967); J.D., University of Florida (1971); LL.M., New York University
(1973); M.L.L., University of Washington (1982); now teaching at the University of Southwestern Louisi-
ana. The author wishes to thank Professor Tom Regan of North Carolina State University, without whose
ideas this paper would not have been written. Any sound logic in the philosophical discussion of animal
rights should be attributed to Mr. Regan, any errors in interpretation to the author.
'A. Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, in THE EXTENDED CIRCLE 316 (J. Wynne-Tyson ed. 1985).
2 State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-431 (Pulaski County Cir. Ct. (Ind.) Mar. 13, 1980). This was reputedly
the first case in which a corporation was sued under a reckless homicide statute for allegedly failing to
warn of a dangerous defect in product design. Ford was acquitted. See C. Redman, Indiana's Pinto Trial
May Alter Corporate Responsibility in the US., Washington Star, March 9, 1980; L. STROBEL. RECKLESS
HOMICIDE? (1980). In another suit against Ford, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), punitive damages of $125 million were awarded for uncrashworthiness
in design to the family of a 13 year old boy who died in the flames of a defective Pinto. It was the largest
punitive damages sum ever awarded in a products liability suit and was eventually reduced to $3.5 million.
3 See S. PERRY & J. DAWSON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985), and M. MINTZ. AT
ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN. ANDTHE DALKON SHIELD (1985), for a detailed discussion of the
Dalkon Shield story, in which A.H. Robins has been sued for damages by thousands of women for injuries
ranging from forced sterilization to death.
4 See Alexander, Crime in the Suites, TIME, June 10, 1985, at 56-57. E.F Hutton pleaded guilty to bank
fraud that cost 400 banks $8 million. They agreed to repay the banks and no executives were criminally
prosecuted. Congressional critics were furious. Said Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, "Respect for the
law suffers immensely when the public reads that you have [the Hutton] scheme going on, and nobody
is prosecuted. I think it is a travesty." Id. See also Weiss, How E.F Hutton is Trying to Clean its Slate,
BUSINESS WEEK. Jan. 26, 1987, at 79; Tell, Hutton's Check Scheme Floats it into Troubled Waters: Pleads
Guilty to Fraud Counts: SEC Delays Move on Disqualification, BARRONS. May 6, 1985, at 34; Bianco,
What Did Hutton's Managers Know - and When Did They Know It?, BUSINESS WEEK. May 20, 1985,
at 110-12.
5 See Glaberson et al., Who'll be the Next to Fall?, BUSINESS WEEK. Dec. 1, 1986, at 28. In the biggest
insider trading scandal in Wall Street history, famous arbitrager, Ivan Boesky, agreed to pay the govern-
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cial scandals in this country. Recently, however, one particular aspect of cor-
porate responsibility has come to occupy more time of corporate boards,
managerial decision-makers, consumer watch-dogs, and college professors.
The issue is environmental ethics.6 What responsibility does a corporation
have to the natural environment, its indigenous animal inhabitants, and the people
who use and appreciate it? Surely, the problems of toxic and nuclear waste,
acid rain, and the depletion of natural fossil resources such as oil have recently
become more central to the debate over corporate responsibility in this society.
Right now, the Alaskan landscape is being fought over (once more) by en-
vironmentalists and oil companies 7 who claim we need more fuel, even if it
happens to be located in the midst of a National Wildlife Refuge.
We have gotten used to the idea of corporate environmental responsibility.
We have not resolved the issue or discovered the optimal formula which pro-
vides an ecologically protective policy and simultaneously allows for reasonable
utilization of natural resources and technological and industrial growth, but
we have now accepted that an inquiry into the limitations on corporate license
to "explore" the environment is a valid and even necessary facet of "doing
business" in the modern age. While we continue to search for the proper balance
between industry and ecology, we have realized that the two are interdependent.
Now that our culture has accepted the environmental ethic as a necessary
component of corporate morality in a post-industrial society, we see a new ethical
topic being debated with increasing frequency. This new element introducing
ment $100 million-half in damages, half in disgorged profits, and, in return for a guaranty of no more
than five years in jail, to tell all he knew about insider trading irregularities on Wall Street. The scandal
spread like wildfire until February, 1987 when "principals of two of the classiest old-line investment banks
were arrested at their desks and taken out through a trading room full of open-mouthed colleagues. One
indeed wore handcuffs. Like a common criminal." A. Bianco & G. Weiss, Suddenly the Fish Get Bigger,
BUSINESS WEEK. March 2, 1987, at 28. (The article includes a "scorecard" of all the investment bankers
arrested to date in this growing scandal.) See also N. Youman, Boesky
, 
Affair May Tarnish Brokerage In-
dustrv Image, ADWEEK MARK WEEK. Nov. 24, 1986, at 11; G. Kinkead, Ivan Boesky: Crook of the Year,
FORTUNE, Jan. 5, 1987, at 48; Glaberson, Did the SEC Give Boesky Too Sweet a Deal, BUSINESS WEEK,
Dec. 8, 1986, at 37.
6 See E. Johnson, Treating the Dirt: Environmental Ethics and Moral Theory, in EARTHBOUND 339 (T.
Regan ed. 1984); T. REGAN, The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic, in ALL THAT DWELL
THEREIN. ESSAYS ON ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIcs [hereinafter cited as ALL THAT DWELL]
(1982).
7See Defenders of Wildlife, AcrivIST NEWS NETWORK. Feb., 1987, at 3: '.. . [Congressman] Morris Udall
... introduced ...legislation which would designate as wilderness the 1.5 million acre coastal plain
within the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge .... The bill is the latest in a series of battles to determine
whether this pristine arctic environment will be explored and developed for its oil and gas reserves or
left intact as wilderness .... The Interior Department ... in a draft report of the congressionally man-
dated study ... recommended that the entire coastal plain be opened for oil and gas development. After
combing through the ... draft report, Defenders of Wildlife and three other conservation groups discovered
that the Interior Department failed to mention there is only a 19% chance of discovering any recoverable
oil. The bill in question, The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Bill H.R. 39, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987),
has over 70 co-sponsors at this time. The bill would prohibit any oil exploration within the boundaries
of the refuge. As of now, under The Alaska Lands Act, sec. 1003, drilling may not take place in the refuge
without Congressional action to that effect." See also Jones, The Development of Alaska's Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Oil and Gas Resources and the Federal Trust Responsibility to Native Alaskans, 6 VA. J.
OF NAT. RESOURCE LAW 53 (1986).
[Vol. 21:2
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USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS
itself, somewhat controversially, into the field of business ethics is the concept
of animal interests. Does the Biblical mention 8 of man's dominion over animals
endow us with a moral right to abuse nonhumans without limit, or does man
have a responsibility of benign stewardship toward the "lesser" creatures?9
We are seeing the relationship between man and beast called into focus
by critics who propound moral questions that cannot readily be answered.
Philosophers take the question of animal interests quite seriously and a number
of scholarly books have been written on the subject.' 0 Laws regulate the use
of animals; however, laws are minimal guidelines, and ethically proper con-
duct frequently demands greater responsibility from us than does the law. A
relationship exists between business ethics, animal interests, and the law, and
this paper will consider that functional matrix, but limit its application to the
corporate use of laboratory animals.
This paper will examine, first, the fundamental theories pertaining to animal
interests; then the relevant laws and the recognition of animal interests the laws
require of corporate laboratories; and finally, how (if at all) these claims to
interests for animals impinge upon corporate ethics. Perhaps a consideration
of these matters will clarify the validity of the unorthodox proposition that cor-
porate responsibility extends to nonhumans.
ANIMAL INTERESTS
The attribute of "interest" discussed herein means to have a sentient capacity
for experiencing pleasure and pain and correlative preferences, however minimal,
that creates a corresponding obligation in others toward any entity possessing
such interests. It is implied here that beings owing obligations to animals with
interests are, in fact, moral beings, capable of understanding right and wrong
and therefore having the capacity to be obliged toward others.
Those beings with moral capacities are known as moral agents. Those be-
ings that are owed obligations by moral agents, whether or not they themselves
are capable of such moral discernment, are known as moral patients. If we
assume that most animals are incapable of moral reasoning, and thereby preclud-
ed from the category of moral agents, they are still, if shown to be owed cer-
8 The following passage is frequently cited as moral justification for abusive treatment toward animals:
". . and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle,
and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Genesis 1:26 (King James).
9 For an interesting perspective running counter to this attitude, See T. Regan, The Promise and Challenge
of Religion, THE ANIMALS' AGENDA, April, 1986, at 30: [Elven if we believe in mankind's mystical primacy
over the animals, the Bible clearly teaches that some of the things that are done to them are simply sinful
in the eyes of God. Could a God that despises a 'proud look' be anything but outraged at the sight of
a $25 thousand mink coat?" In a more pointed statement that speaks directly to the issue of research with
animal subjects, Regan suggests that -[i]t is a morally depraved image of the Good Shepherd that would
allow us to blind, shock, burn, drown, suffocate, starve or mutilate our animal brethren-all in the name
of science." Id. at 36.
0 See, e.g., T. REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL, supr note 6; T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983);
P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1975).
Fall, 19871
3
Hoch: Use of Laboratory Animals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON LAW REVIEW
tain commissions or omissions in conduct by others, moral patients.,I
The view that animals have no interests shall be called the minimalist posi-
tion. This argument holds that animals are neither moral agents nor moral pa-
tients. They are incapable of moral reasoning and there is no basis for a person
to be ethically obligated to animals in any way. Animals may be used without
reservation in any fashion for any reason whatsoever.
Rene Descartes was the most famous and original proponent of this posi-
tion, comparing animals to clockwork-like mechanisms, incapable of feeling
and impervious to pain. Said Descartes, "like the clock, animals are not con-
scious." 12 This is as minimalist a position as can be taken in regard to animal
interests. Slightly less indifferent is the view that animals may indeed suffer
pain, but that that suffering is their burden in being here to serve human ends. 3
The least indifferent of the minimalist positions, but one still wholly without
regard or concern for animals, is the idea that abusive cruelty toward animals
is unacceptable because such conduct may demean the moral status of the
abuser.14
These positions seem remarkable in light of what we now know about
animals' abilities to communicate with each other (and with humans),'15 show
loyalty,16 solve simple but abstract problems,' 7 and plan for the future.8 The
IFor a discussion of moral agents and moral patients, see T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS
(1983), at 151-156.
12 Comment, Antinomy: The, Use, Rights, and Regulation of Laboratory Animals, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv.
723 (1986) (quoting REGAN, supra note 11, at 3).
13See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14 "Advocates of rights for nonhumans have argued that ... the statutes are 'to preserve the moral stan-
dards of human beings rather than to prevent the abuse of other living creatures.'" Comment, Rights for
Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model for Dogs and Cats, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 490 (1977) (quoting
Committee For Humane Legislation, Inc., Model State Animal Protection Statutes (undated)). See Nelson,
Duties to Animals, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 149 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds.
1972); Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL. AF. 205 (1975).
'
5 See F. PATTERSON & E. LINDEN, THE EDUCATION OF KOKO (1981). This book describes the relationship
between Patterson and Koko, a gorilla she taught to speak in sign language. See also T. SEBEOK & A.
RAMSAY, APPROACHES To ANIMAL COMMUNICATION (1969).
16 See F ROBSON, STRANDINGS, WAYS To SAVE WHALES: A HUMANE CONSERVATIONIST'S GUIDE (1984).
The author writes of the strong loyalties that bind cetaceans, and claims this loyalty, among other things,
leads to many of the mass whale beachings.
17 See, e.g., K. PRYOR, DON'T SHOOr THE DOG! THE NEW ART OF TEACHING AND TRAINING (1985), at 171,
where the author, a renowned animal trainer, discusses not only the learning skills of dolphins, but their
creative capacities as well: "[T]he subjects caught on and began 'inventing' . . . amusing behaviors..
• .Once those dolphins learned the value of innovating, they became real nuisances, opening gates, steal-
ing props, and inventing mischief." See also D. McKelvey, Llamas, Leopards, and Leaping Lizards,
CREATIVE LIVING, Winter, 1987, at 5. McKelvey discusses the capacity of buzzards to rationally minimize
danger: "[Bluzzards are now not only selecting road kills ... but are dragging them off the pavement
before consuming them." The tales of what conundrums animals will solve to get at food are legion. Does
this not involve a rational problem-solving capacity? For a porpoise to go after a fish dinner may be in-
stinctive, but for that same porpoise to choose between a red and a green door to get at that fish requires
an altogether different level of cognitive abstraction.
18 Ethologists continually discover more indices of animal conduct that connote anticipation of the future.
On the simplest level, do not birds build nests to house their yet unborn, squirrels store nuts for the winter,
and dogs bury bones in an exercise of rationally selected delayed gratification? As Tom Regan put it: "We
[Vol. 21:2
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belief that many animals possess faculties often considered the exclusive do-
main of humans is by no means novel. Over a hundred years ago, Darwin wrote
that "the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love,
memory, attention, and curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts,
may well be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed con-
dition, in the lower animals." 19
Nevertheless, minimalist views are still widely-held (and one may wonder
if the claim that animals have no interests is based on a genuine belief or a
need to conveniently justify the abuse of helpless creatures). Countering this
argument is the view that animals in fact have interests entitling them to moral
consideration by human beings. The animal interest school of thought can be
divided into two basic camps, the utilitarian position, and the rights position.
The most fundamental position in support of animal interests was stated
with an almost mystical clarity by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham who
declared that the question is not "[clan they reason? or can they talk? but, can
they suffer?" 20 Bentham was a utilitarian philosopher, however, and allowed
for various situations in which it would be perfectly acceptable to subject an
animal to suffering. The utilitarian philosophy requires more restraint in af-
fording animals protection than does the minimalist position, but under
utilitarianism, human obligations are founded upon the notion of promoting
a greater sum good, rather than upon any inhering of fundamental rights in
individual nonhuman creatures.
The heart of the utilitarian philosophy is that "[e]veryone ought to act so
as to bring about the greatest possible balance of intrinsic good over intrinsic
evil for everyone concerned." 21 According to utilitarianism, what moral agents
ought to do is that which, directly or indirectly, can most reasonably be ex-
pected to result in the best consequences (where goodness of consequence is
measured by the extent to which satisfaction of preference is maximized, and
dissatisfaction minimized) 22
This is the contention of the renowned utilitarian "animal interest"
philosopher, Peter Singer. Singer claims that in deriving the optimal calculus
(that which will result in the most benefit for the most beings with interests)
we are to take into account all interests, including those of animals.2 3 Obvious-
have .. reasons for crediting .. animals with beliefs about the future ... since to act in the present
with the intention of satisfying one's desire in the future (as Fido does when he acts in a way that leads
us to let him out in order that he may satisfy his desire by getting his mouth on the bone he believes
we have buried) requires that Fido and ... other animals have these beliefs." T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983), at 75.
19 Comment, supra note 14, at 498 (quoting C. DARWIN. DESCENT OF MAN 193 (1871)).
20J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, at ch. 17.
21 T. Regan, Introduction, in JUST BUSINESS: NEW INTRODUCWoRY ESSAYS IN BUSINESS ETHICS [hereinafter
cited as JUST BUSINESs] 21 (T. Regan ed. 1984).
22E. Johnson, supra note 6, at 339.
231d. at 340. See also P. SINGER, supra note 10.
Fall, 19871
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ly, this position goes beyond the minimalist stance in that it does attribute in-
terests to animals.
Singer argues that since animals can suffer like people, they have interests
like people. According to Singer, animals have an equal claim to relief from
pain. However, like most animal protectionists, Singer eventually concedes that
even while speciesism 24 (an anthropocentric assumption that human claims are
superior to claims of other species) is unacceptable, there is some type of hierar-
chical ladder of claims. As Singer himself puts it, "it does seem that the more
highly developed the conscious life of the being, the greater the degree of self-
awareness and rationality, the more one would prefer that kind of life.. ." 25
Consistent with this view, Singer agrees with conventional wisdom that the
average human life is more important in determining the overall utilitarian good
than the average nonhuman life.
Singer goes far beyond the minimalist position and finds that animals do
indeed have interests. He even argues that these interests require human beings
(as moral agents) to discontinue the hunting and eating of animals. However,
he is still an advocate of the utilitarian school, which has two weaknesses in-
sofar as the protection of animals is concerned.
First, it is very difficult to determine the proper weights to afford each
variable in the utilitarian calculus when animal interests conflict with human
interests. If, for example, an experiment that causes suffering and death to fif-
ty thousand mice might result in a vaccine that will immunize children under
ten years of age against a severe type of measles that would cause them con-
siderable temporary discomfort but not threaten their lives, how does one ac-
curately calculate the greatest good for the greatest number? We have here
qualitative values that cannot be precisely quantified.
Even if one has moved beyond the minimalist position (that no considera-
tion of animal well-being is valid), most of us, like Singer, adhere to a hierar-
chical scale of worth or prioritized claims which complicates the utilitarian
formula by comparing the value of the lives of mice to the cost of children's
discomfort in order to arrive at the proper course of conduct in this instance.
Where situations can be easily calculated, however, the utilitarian princi-
ple does lend greater protection to animals than the anthropocentric minimalist
position. For example, in testing cosmetics, particularly eyeliners and
eyeshadows, a process known as the Draize test 26 is frequently used. This in-
volves restraining an animal (usually a rabbit) in a device so it cannot move,
24 Speciesism (according to Singer) is "a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of
one's own species and against those members of other species." P. SINGER, supra note 10, at 7. An-
thropocentrism, then, is speciesism practiced by human beings.
25 P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979), at 90.
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and inserting drops of a cosmetic formula into the eye of the creature. The
resulting ulceration, blindness, carcinogenic consequence, or death of the rab-
bit is studied to determine the suitability of various cosmetics.
In cases such as this, utilitarianism recognizes or insists that the intense
suffering, if not the very life of the animal(s) in question, outweighs the im-
portance of women having a cosmetic eyeliner, which is clearly a nonessential
luxury. Thus, the utilitarian position, even though the weakest argument for
animal interests, could result in radical demands upon our culture, if applied
with philosophical integrity. Nevertheless, utilitarian choices are not always
as clear as this example and a second shortcoming remains.
The second problem is that the utilitarian view allows for the intentional
imposition of suffering upon any number of beings if such suffering can be
expected to provide a greater overall good for an even greater number of be-
ings. In short, the utilitarian position minimizes the importance of individual
claims made by beings in their capacity as moral patients.
The second pro-interest view attempts to solve these problems by attributing
rights to animals. The most eloquent proponent of this position is North Carolina
State philosophy professor Tom Regan, who argues that animals possess in-
herent rights which stem from the fact that they are "the subjects of a life that
is better or worse for them, logically independently of whether they are valued
by anyone else." 27
Regan attributes rights to animals in the same way he would claim them
for human beings. Briefly, he claims that we must distinguish an animal from
a human before we can philosophically deny it rights that humans are afforded
without question. Regan persuasively argues that many mammals have greater
consciousness and the attendant capacity to prefer, perceive, discriminate be-
tween things, and experience pain and pleasure than do some humans, such
as seriously retarded or brain-dead people, and infant children.
Having attributed inherent rights to animals, Regan argues that while cir-
cumstances may arise in which morality permits us to harm innocent individuals,
the only way we can justify harming those animals that do have a discerning
life is by having a "very good reason to believe that overriding the individual's
right prevents, and is the only realistic way to prevent, vastly greater harm to
other innocent individuals." 28
27ALL THAT DWELL. supra note 6, at 94.
21d. at 96-97. Suppose, for example, that a terrorist held a loaded gun to the throat of a hostage and
stood ten feet from his car, in which, we had very strong reason to believe was the detonating device
to set off a nuclear blast that would destroy an entire city. If a "SWAT" team of police sharpshooters
was fairly certain that its members could shoot through the hostage and kill the terrorist, and we had every
reason to believe that the terrorist fully intended to move to the car using the hostage as a safety screen,
and set offthe nuclear device, this would then constitute one of the very limited situations in which Regan
would consider it acceptable to injure or kill an innocent person (with a discerning life) as a necessity
for protecting a far greater number of lives.
Fall, 1987]
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Critics of this position argue that no inherent rights adhere in beings that
are not innocent, and that only moral agents (those capable of discerning right
from wrong) can be innocent, because only they can be guilty. Innocents,
however, include not only moral agents but moral patients (those capable of
being undeserving recipients of wrongs committed by others).2 9 If one does
not accept this position then one cannot argue for the inherent right of retarded
people and infants to be protected from harm by wrongdoers.
Certain aspects of Regan's position are questioned by other animal rights
advocates. Australian philosopher Mary Anne Warren calls Regan's thesis the
"strong animal rights" position and argues that his philosophy requires one
to adopt the view that all mammals (both human and nonhuman) have moral
rights of the same strength.3 o Furthermore, Warren suggests that "inherent value
appears as a mysterious non-natural property which we must take on faith." 3
The gist of Warren's argument is that Regan requires us, in her opinion, to
grant to all beings with inherent value equal moral claims, and to all beings
without inherent value, no moral claims (no status as a moral patient). She
believes that this line of demarcation, arrived at through the implementation
of a formula based upon a non-assessable quality known as inherent value, is
unnecessary and that we may simply allow the rights of animals with different
claims to vary in strength.32
Warren calls this the "weak animal rights" theory,3 3 and claims that
creatures' moral claims vary proportionately with their respective degrees of
mental sophistication, since more mentally sophisticated beings are capable
of greater suffering. Consistent with this position, one can then claim that humans
have greater rights than nonhumans. (Here again, we see the hierarchical lad-
der of prioritized claims.)
Warren by no means uses this tenet to argue that humans have unques-
tioned license to do with animals as they please. On the contrary, she (like
Regan) suggests that no being capable of pain and suffering should be sub-
jected to such experiences without good reason and concludes that no sentient
being should be killed without just cause.
While Warren disputes the technical logic in Regan's position, she cer-
tainly agrees with his basic and most important premise that many nonhumans
have substantial moral claims and even suggests that it is "perhaps probable
that some non-human animals - such as cetaceans and anthropoid apes - should
29 See T. Regan, supra note II.
30 M.A. Warren, Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position, BETWEEN THE SPECIES: A JOURNAL
OF ETHICS. Fall 1986, at 163.
31 Id. at 165.
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be regarded as persons... and have the same basic moral rights as human[s]." 14
In spite of her criticism of Regan, Warren is a staunch supporter of animal rights.
The trend today, in both cultural and philosophical terms, is toward a greater
recognition of the legitimacy of animals' moral claims. In this regard, the law
is certainly behind the times.
ANIMALS AND THE LAW
Common Law and Standing
The common law has historically treated animals as mere property with
no rights.35 "Blackstone set the common law standard by characterizing cats
and dogs as creatures 'only kept for pleasure, curiosity, or whim.' Their value
was not intrinsic; rather, it depended 'on the caprice of the owner'." 36 Statutory
law pertaining to animals has traditionally been concerned with the interests
of humans, not animals. These concerns were basically that animal cruelty should
be prevented because it is morally debasing for humans to act in an abusive
manner and that animal extinction would deplete valuable resources.
3 7
Animal protectionists have long sought autonomous legal recognition for
animal interests, and frequently petition the courts for permission to serve as
legal guardians for nonhumans. Most attempts have failed, however, because
the courts usually deny standing to animals or their guardian advocates. The
United States Supreme Court has said that standing requires a showing that
a legal right has been invaded 38 or that a "zone of interests" 39 should be pro-
tected. Many courts fear that granting private parties standing to sue for in-
junctive relief on behalf of animals would cause "utter chaos" in the courts.0
Nevertheless, some judges (usually federal) have granted standing to animal
groups.
In Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 41 petitioners challenged the termina-
tion of a moratorium on allowing the importing of sealskin furs from South
Africa.42 In granting petitioner organization standing, the court said, "[wihere
an act is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals,
who are uniquely incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes
us as eminently logical to allow groups specifically concerned with animal
34 1d. at 172.
151t is worth noting that slaves were once treated in the identical manner under common law.
36Comment, supra note 14, at 487 (quoting H W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1241 (W.C. Jones ed. 1916).
37Comment, supra note 12, at 739.
38Ass'n. of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1969).
39Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1969).
40Parker v. Lowery, 446 S.W. 2d 593, 595-96 (Mo. 1969).
41561 F2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
42 See Note, supra note 12, at 738, 739.
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welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in enforcing the statute." 43
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision'4 4 where an animal protection organiza-
tion sought to enjoin the Navy from shooting feral goats on Navy property,
the court held that the group lacked standing because the shooting took place
on an island and produced no "direct sensory impact" on the organization's
own environment. 45 However, the court noted that a showing of adequate
"longevity and indicia of commitment to preventing inhumane behavior" would
be a proper basis for standing 46
Animal advocates seek liberalized standing rules that would grant easier
access to the courts for people wishing to serve as guardians to animals. In
Creating a Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 47 Karen
L. McDonald points out that professional associations are frequently granted
standing to sue because "the courts see the professionals and their associations
as being in the best position to protect the interests of the public." 48 She argues
that animal welfare groups should also be viewed as professional associations
with legal standing to sue in animal cruelty cases.
McDonald points out that state courts are not bound by the case or con-
troversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution 49 and suggests that
they may be growing increasingly more amenable to arguments that would allow
persons to serve protective legal stewardships on behalf of animals. Several
state courts are now granting standing to non-traditional parties who claim that
a public interest is involved, particularly if they can show a "slight additional
private interest." 10 According to McDonald, "[t]he willingness of state courts
to recognize nontraditional plaintiffs in public interest actions should result in
a liberalization of standing requirements in actions to enjoin public nuisances.' 15
43Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d, 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In this case the Court granted
standing on the basis of statutory implication. Id. at 1006. However, standing was also based on a three-
part test derived from prior Supreme Court decisions, under which 1) an injury in fact must exist; 2)
a causal connection between plaintiffs injury and defendant's action must exist; and 3) the interest to
which injury is claimed must fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Id. at 1005. The
Court found injury in fact to members' "recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and educational interests." Id.
at 1007. A causal relationship, said the Court, means a "substantial probability" that if the relief requested
is granted, the injury will be removed. Id. at 1009 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)).
The Court also held that the interest sought to be protected here was within the "zone of interests ..
. regulated by the statute ...in question." Id. at 1010 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Service Org.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1969)).
44Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985).
41Id. at 939.
46Id.
47 Comment, Creating A Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
399 (1986).
48Id. at 424.
49U.S. CONsT. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1.
50 See, e.g., Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (1980). The Court here held that a
state court is not bound by case and controversy requirements and "remains free to fashion its own law
of standing consistent with notions of substantial justice. Id.
5 Comment, supra note 47, at 429.
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(Her concept of public nuisance would include animal cruelties perpetrated
in laboratory experiments.)
Animal Legal Defense Fund attorney Joyce Tischler suggests the implemen-
tation of a guardianship model for dogs and cats that would grant humans stand-
ing to sue on behalf of their animal wards5 2 Tischler suggests that the courts
"broaden the definition of natural guardian to include the human who has elected
to take responsibility for the care and well-being of a nonhuman."
53
The idea that nonhuman entities be granted constructive standing through
the agency of human guardians is not new to American jurisprudence. In Sierra
Club v. Morton, 54 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant standing to the Sierra
Club, which was seeking injunctive relief to prohibit the construction of a recrea-
tional resort in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains of
California. 55 The Club sought standing as a representative of the public interest
and was refused, having alleged no injury in fact to any of its members.56
In his classic dissent, however, Justice William 0. Douglas wrote that
"[c]ontemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium
should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for
their own preservation." 57He then argued that inanimate objects such as ships
and corporations have suits brought in their names; further, ecological systems
such as rivers, and all the inanimate, animal, and human interests which such
rivers represent should be entitled to similar standing.58
In a famous law review article, Should Trees Have Standing 59 Christopher
Stone also suggested that natural objects have legal rights. Said Stone, "I am
quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers
and other so-called 'natural objects' in the environment. ." 60 (Stone's vision
of natural objects entitled to standing included animals, of course.) "[W]e should
"2See Comment, supra note 14, at 484.
"Id. at 503.
5-405 U.S. 727 (1972).
55The U.S. Forest Service, entrusted with the maintenance and administration of the national forests, had
approved a plan by Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., to construct a "$35 million complex of motels, restaurants,
swimming pools, parking lots, and other structures designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors daily." Id. at 729.
56 Standing is traditionally granted when the party bringing suit has a legitimate "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
5"Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 741, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58Douglas's eloquent prose is self-explanatory: "The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the
life it sustains or nourishes - fish .. . deer, elk, bear, and all other animals . . . who are dependent
on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water
must be able to speak for the values which the river represents .. ." Id. at 743.
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have a system in which, when a friend of a natural object perceives it to be
endangered, he can apply to a court for the creation of a guardianship." 6' An-
ticipating the incredulity his suggestion would meet, Stone reminded us that
"[t]hroughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new
entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable." 62
While Douglas' and Stone's views may be compelling, they haven't ob-
tained the status of judicial orthodoxy, and the cases here were federal, not
state. Despite a trend toward liberalizing the rules of standing, many state courts
fear administrative chaos would result if standing were granted to animals and
the environment. Add to this the fact that the law still essentially views animals
as no more than proprietary interests of people, and it is apparent that animal
rights advocates will be fighting the common law battle of standing for some
time to come. Meanwhile, animal protectionists must turn to statutory law for
help.
State Regulation
State regulation of animal welfare resides in anti-cruelty statutes. Such stat-
utes have limited effectiveness, however, because "[s]tatutory provisions...
have been exclusively derived from the common law, regarding animals as prop-
erty, whose 'rights' are only established by the interests of humans," 63 and
"almost any human interest is sufficient to outweigh almost any animal interest
... . The 'rights' of the animals are rarely at issue." 64 Anti-cruelty statutes
are not designed to prevent cruelty and are only activated "after the... [animal]
has already suffered the damage. This situation emphasizes that their focus is
on punishing the human rather than protecting the nonhuman." 65 State legisla-
tion usually exempts laboratory research facilities from state interference in
"properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations." 66 However, state
regulation rarely interferes with improperly conducted experiments. When the
state does choose to become involved, it is usually hindered because research-
ers working under federal grants are immune from liability for the violation
of state anti-cruelty statutes.
The most notorious example of this situation is the Taub case.67 Dr. Ed-
ward Taub of the Institute for Behavioral Research in Silver Spring, Maryland,
was convicted under the Maryland anti-cruelty statute for abominable treat-
6 11d. at 464.
61ld. at 453. Stone continued this thought with the observation that "we are inclined to suppose the
rightlessness of rightless 'things' to be a decree of Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of
some status quo." Id.
6Comment, supra note 12, at 746 n. 152.
64Comment supra note 12, at 746.
65Comment, supra note 14, at 501 (citing Burr, supra note 14, at 227-29).
66 Comment, supra note 12, at 747 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE sec. 599c (West 1970)).
6"Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
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ment of monkeys. Monkeys were found suffering with open wounds from self-
amputation, in conditions of extreme filth.68 The Maryland Court of Appeals
overturned the conviction, holding that the state anti-cruelty statute does not
apply to federally funded research.6 9 The fact is that "[n]either the case law
nor the present (state) humane statutes and anti-cruelty laws operate to assure
nonhumans the rights they need and deserve." 70 Perhaps genuine protection
for laboratory animals can be found in federal statutory law.
Federal Regulation
A. Protection of Laboratory Animals and the Animal Welfare Act
Animals don't cease to feel when chosen as experimental subjects. They
are confined, fed, examined, experimented upon and, if not then dead, observed
and studied in post-operative states. Since animals do continue to feel until
death, we should monitor the conditions of their existence as laboratory sub-
jects, inspecting such specifics as confinement cages (their size and cleanliness),
climatic conditions in the laboratory (temperature and humidity), availability
and quality of food and exercise, medical attention, pre- and post-operative
use of anesthetics and painkillers, and access to creature companionship. Does
federal legislation offer substantive protection of this breadth and detail? Let
us consider legislation and amendments intended to protect the interests of
laboratory animals.
Public response to Congressional revelations on the sale of stolen pets to
laboratory facilities prompted the 1966 passage of the Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act.7 ' The Act, intended to protect pet owners from animal theft, also established
humane standards for the treatment of animals in research facilities. Ad-
ministrative and enforcement powers under the statute were vested in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.7 2
The Act did not provide comprehensive protection for laboratory animals
and was soon amended by the Animal Welfare Act of 1970 (AWA). 73 The AWA
acknowledged that animals are in fact entitled to certain basic necessities:
"[A]nimals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of adequate hous-
ing, ample food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient
ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperature, and adequate
veterinary care including the appropriate use of pain-killing drugs." 74
68 See Police Raid Lab, Seize Animals, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
69 Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A. 2d 819 (1983).
70 Comment, supra note 14, at 491.
7 1 Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966).
727 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976).
73 Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970).
74 H. REP. No. 91-1651, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5103, 5104.
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Neither of these Acts demonstrated a Congressional willingness to ques-
tion the arbitrary discretion of medical researchers. A 1970 House report made
that point eminently clear by stating, "The bill in no manner authorizes the
disruption or interference with scientific research or experimentation. Under
this bill the research scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door." 75
Subsequent disclosure of animal abuses led to the 1976 Amendments to
the AWA, which focused on protective measures for animals while in transport.
These abuses commonly involved depirvation of adequate air, food, and water,
unreasonable confinement, and exposure to temperature extremes. The Amend-
ments brought interstate carriers within the regulatory jurisdiction of the statute7 6
and established minimal requirements that interstate handlers must meet before
transporting animals designated for protection under the Act. 7
The 1976 Amendments also clarified provisions of the earlier legislation
and amended certain definitions, particularly the term "animal." 78 In redefin-
ing "animal" to determine what creatures will fall within the protective scope
of the Act, Congress established the statutory basis for a continuing debate as
to what animals are in fact intended to be protected under the legislation. Animal
protectionists argue that the amended 1976 definition should clearly include
rodents, which make up the overwhelming majority of animals used in
laboratories today, but the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
responsible for promulgation and enforcement of regulations under the law,
refuses to classify rodents as animals entitled to protection under the Act. (This
issue will be considered later.)
The latest Amendments, the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals
Act (ISLAA),79 were passed in December, 1985. Although the ISLAA, com-
monly known as the Dole-Brown Act, has been hailed as a "truly rigorous [law]
giving proper protection to laboratory animals," 8 0 it has proven to be an ex-
tremely controversial piece of legislation, and animal protection groups have
been at each other's throats over the Amendment.
Animal rights abolitionists have called the ISLAA a treacherous and re-
gressive step that merely sanctions and perpetuates the abuse and destruction
of animals used in laboratory experiments. Said reporter Carol Grunewald in
The Animals' Agenda (a popular periodical of the animal protection movement),
Despite more than two decades of work by some sectors of the animal
rights movement, there is still no meaningful protection for lab animals
751d.
767 U.S.C. § 2136 (1982).
777 U.S.C. § 2143 (1982).
787 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1982).
79Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985).
80Animal Welfare Institute, AWl QUARTERLY, Winter, 1985/86, at 1.
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nearly 20 years after the adoption of the Animal Welfare Act. . . . Most
animal advocates feel that while [the] professed intentions appear great,
the [ISLAA] lacks integrity. Activists point to a host of inadequacies, the
foremost of these being that . . . the bill do[es] not address the use of
animals during experimentation."
In a letter to The Animals' Agenda, Christine Stevens, of the Society for
Animal Protective Legislation, claimed that Grunewald's criticism that the
ISLAA does not cover animals during experimentation is a misconception. Said
Stevens, "The more specific requirements [of the ISLAA] with respect to pain
relief and pain avoidance will apply at all times, not merely to the period before
and after use and not merely to the care of the animals." 8 2
Grunewald's remarks were tame when compared to a position paper issued
by another group, United Action for Animals (UAA). In their stinging con-
demnation of the Act and its supporters, UAAs report said: "One animal welfare
society... is happy because the amendment provides [for the exercise of dogs]
... We assume the dogs are exercised before they are baked alive in microwave
ovens, or before their spines are severed, as they could hardly be exercised af-
terwards." 83
The report later quotes from a letter written by ISLAA co-author, Rep.
George E. Brown (D-California), to the journal SCIENCE, in which he wrote:
"I have worked to make it the least possible burden to researchers. Instead,
it will benefit the research community, since improving laboratory animal care
can increase accuracy in research and enhance society's continued support for
these institutions." 84
Brown's admission that he worked for the "least possible burden to re-
searchers" arguably lends credence to his critics' case 5 The UAA report went
on to say, "What [Brown] means is that if the public is led to believe that
laboratory animals are well 'cared' for, the public will not object to the animals
being burned, blinded, gassed, blasted by explosives, starved and all other
obscene cruelties inflicted on them, because they are being 'cared' for." 8 6 While
other animal rights spokespersons were less scathing in their indictment of the
ISLAA, many consider the new legislation to be woefully ineffective. Animal
welfare groups, however, are pleased with passage of the new Act. One group
reported to its members that, "For us in AWl the victory is especially sweet." 87
81 Carol Grunewald, Protection v. Prevention - Which (if any) of Two Proposed Laws Would Help Lab
Animals Now? THE ANIMALS' AGENDA. May 1985, at 12, 13.
82Letter from Christine Stevens to Letters Section, ThE ANIMALS' AGENDA. July-Aug. 1985, at 3.
8
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In a quarterly report to members of the National Alliance for Animal
Legislation, Syndee Brinkman wrote:
We consider the passage of this legislation a step in the right direction
... We know that there was/is a lot of controversy surrounding this par-
ticular legislation within the humane community. However, we want our
members to know that those amendments to the Animal Welfare Act are
provisions which we support. It is an unfortunate fact that animals are in
labs; but we believe that these animals will experience a "bit of a better"
situation. That does not mean that we will stop here.88
The debate raises questions of consequence, for there may be some truth
in the biting claim of animal rights advocates that the ISLAA is merely a facade,
granting researchers covert license to maltreat animal subjects in perpetuity.
The ISLAA was never intended to prohibit the experimental use of animal
subjects. Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) co-sponsored the Bill. In his open-
ing statement before the 1983 Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Hearing on the ISLAA, he said, "It's certainly not my intent to eliminate
animals from scientific research." 89 Animals will continue to be used in research
and abolitionists will continue to apprise the lay and scientific communities
of viable alternatives and the unconscionability (in their opinion) of such ex-
periments. Ms. Brinkman's position, however, is founded on an irrefutable cor-
ollary: Any reduction in the suffering these creatures experience will improve
the quality of their lives, however pathetic those lives may be.
The purpose of the ISLAA is to provide laboratory animals greater pro-
tection from pain and distress than they were afforded under various federal
statutes collectively known as the Animal Welfare Act. While the specifics of
the new Act are complicated, its focus is straightforward.
Arguing for passage at House Hearings in the fall of 1984, Christine Stevens
described the effect it would have:
[The Act] would ... prevent avoidable pain and pain that can be relieved
by drugs and other methods. The principal investigator . . . would con-
sider alternatives to any painful experiment .... The National Agricultural
Library would provide him with updated information on substitutes for
laboratory animals, ways of limiting their numbers to those strictly
necessary, and the best ways of preventing pain and distress.... He would
consult with a veterinarian before performing an experiement which could
cause pain in order to ascertain the best methods of avoiding it.o
88S. Brinkman, Alliance: Quarterly Report To Our Members, March, 1986, at 1,2.
89 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals, 1983: Hearings on S. 657 Before the Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (opening statement of Sen. Robert
Dole).
90 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act (1984): And Enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act
by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: Hearings on H. R. 5725 Before the House Subcommit-
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At the Senate Hearing, Stevens argued more philosophically for legislative
enactment:
There is a form of blindness, which I have often observed in the course
of decades of visiting laboratories, that makes legislation ... so necessary.
It is easy to become accustomed to the sight of needless suffering and even
easier when ... responsible individuals in an institution rarely even look
at the animals?'
While advocates of the ISLAA promoted it as a moderate measure and
militant abolitionists labeled the bill worthless, members of the commercial
and scientific communities found the bill less innocuous, as evidenced by their
opposition to its passage. James B. Wyngaarden, Director of the National In-
stitutes of Health, which awards vast sums of federal money in research grants,
argued against the bill, stating "We agree with its goal ...we do not agree,
however, with the premise that new legislation is needed to achieve that end." 9
2
Opponents of the new Act insisted at the House Hearings that the abuse
of laboratory animals is an exceptional occurrence. Dr. Glenn Geelhoed, speak-
ing for the Association of American Medical Colleges, argued that the bill was
sponsored as a result of unfair claims of animal mistreatment.
These groups ...by citing infrequent and extreme examples ...have
created an unjust image of research laboratories as torture chambers where
animals are mistreated and neglected. As a result, these organizations have
been able to lend credibility to efforts encouraging the adoption of govern-
mental policies that would seriously impede the progress of one of our
nation's most treasured resources - its biomedical research enterprise? 3
Dr. Gerald Van Hoosier, Jr., Director of Animal Medicine at the Univer-
sity of Washington, said the "allegations of general mistreatment of animals
in research are devoid of factual basis." 94 Steven L. Kopperud, Legislative Direc-
tor of the American Feed Manufacturer's Association, stated that "There is
no verifiable record of the alleged widespread abuse of lab animals."95
These statements echo the opinion expressed at the earlier Senate Hearing
by Dr. Walter Randall, of the American Physiological Society, who said that
"statements of malicious laboratory animal abuse by those who oppose animal
research and scientific inquiry are anecdotal and are largely without verifica-
tee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 219 (1984) (prepared statement of Christine Stevens).
9 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 125 (statement of Christine Stevens, Society for Animal Protective
Legislation).
92 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 28, 29 (statement of James B. Wyngaarden, National Institutes of Health).
93House Hearings, supra note 90, at 150 (prepared statement of Glenn Geelhoed, Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges).
94 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 42 (statement of Gerald Van Hoosier, University of Washington).
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tion." 96
Christine Stevens impeached the credibility of these statements, however,
with a documented presentation of materials obtained from the USDA under
the Freedom of Information Act. Explained Ms. Stevens:
Far from being a rarity, animal abuse is extremely common .... The data
collected shows that major and repeated deficiencies or alleged violations
of the minimum standards of the Animal Welfare Act [were committed]
by 23.7 percent of [a] sample of 186 institutions. Another 22 percent have
less frequent major violations, 28.5 percent have only minor ones, and
1.6 percent are under investigation. Thus, even using the most optimistic
assumptions, only 24.2 percent of registered research facilities are regularly
meeting the existing minimum standards of the Animal Welfare Act.9 7
B. Analyzing Key Provisions of the ISLAA
The intense opposition raised before the new Act's98 passage could be a
portent of its potential value. A review of the ISLAA's key provisions may pro-
vide further insight into the Act's true significance.
Animal Pain and Distress and the Use of Anesthetics and Painkillers
The ISLAA requires research facilities "in experimental procedures to en-
sure that animal pain and distress are minimized, including adequate veterinary
care with the appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizing drugs, or
euthanasia. . . ." 99 At first glance, this provision appears likely to reduce the
amount of suffering to which lab animals will be subjected in the future. The
Act further states, however, that "exceptions to such standards may be made
only when specified by research protocol" 100 and that "[niothing in this Act
... shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary [of the USDA] to promulgate
rules . . . with regard to the performance of actual . . . experimentation by
a research facility. . .. " ,0o
While the language of the Act goes on to require that exceptions to the
provision for minimizing animal pain "be detailed and explained in a report," 102
it clearly leaves researchers discretionary power to decide when protocol
precludes the use of painkillers. This interpretation is supported by Dean Franklin
M. Loew, of the Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, who said
that "these proposals would not restrict even painful research providing that
96 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 48 (statement of Walter Randall, American Physiological Society).
91 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 104 (statement of Christine Stevens, Society for Animal Protective
Legislation).
98 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985).
99 Id.
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appropriate review and accountability ...takes place." 103 Perhaps being re-
quired to justify the withholding of anesthetics from an animal will lead to more
"soul-searching" by researchers as to when the administration of pain reduc-
ing agents is appropriate.
In response to a USDA solicitation for suggested guidelines in the Federal
Register, 04 the Animal Legal Defense Fund has written a Submission on Pain
and Anesthesia'0 5 favoring the promulgation of regulations listing experiments
which should not be performed on unanesthetized animals, including "surgery,
burning, scalding, trauma produced by drumming, beating... or other means,
bone fracture, drowning ... microwave and other radiation, rapid decompres-
sion, and prey killing." 106
The gravity of this act can't be understood without a visceral grasp of what
lies beneath the veneer of polished jargon. We are talking here about experiments
such as "the scalding of baboons and guinea pigs, burning of dogs with hotplates,
and the exposure of fully conscious rabbits and guinea pigs to the chemical
warfare agent sulfur mustard.' 07 Any restrictions on the imposition of these
types of suffering are welcome relief. The limits which the USDA will impose
in its new regulations remain to be seen.
The new Act requires that the "principal investigator considers alternatives
to any procedure likely to produce pain to or distress in an experimental ani-
mal" 108 and also, "in any practice which could cause pain to animals ... that
a doctor of veterinary medicine is consulted in the planning of such procedures
for the use of tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics." ' 09 Common sense and
modest optimism suggest that required veterinary consultation prior to painful
experimentation should often contribute to a reduction in the subject's suffering.
The Act further requires veterinary consultation for "pre-surgical and post-
surgical care by laboratory workers, in accordance with established veterinary
medical and nursing procedures." 'jo Enforcement of this provision could end
the horror stories about post-surgical neglect of laboratory animals. The Society
for Animal Protective Legislation's 1984 report to Congress described a typical
example, wherein a "dog [was] suffering unbearable pain and bleeding heavily
103House Hearings, supra note 90, at 38 (statement of Franklin M. Loew, Tufts University School of
Veterinary Medicine).
10451 FED. REG. 7950 (1986).
105 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Submission On Pain and Anesthesia With Reference to the Improved Stan-
dards for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985, 1986.
10 6 1d. at 11.
107 Id. at 30, 31, 37.
'
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following heart surgery [and] analgesics [had] not been administered." It
Dr. John McCardle, former Director of Laboratory Animal Welfare for
the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), pointed out in his testimony
before Congress that such neglect is not the exception to the rule:
Although the value of proper post-surgical and nursing care is a basic tenet
of modern veterinary practice, it is not universally characteristic of
biomedical research laboratories and is often absent in testing laboratories,
whose goals usually are to allow the animals to die as a consequence of
the testing protocols.' t 2
The Act also dictates that no animal shall be "used in more than one ma-
jor operative experiment from which it is allowed to recover except in cases
of scientific necessity." 113 This theoretically limits multiple surgeries on the
same test animal to instances where the protocol in one procedure is inseparably
predicated upon a prior surgical experiment. The provision may restrict the
traditionally habitual laboratory practice of cumulatively dismembering animals
in serial steps. The Act provides the Secretary (of the USDA), however, with
broad discretionary power to make exceptions." 14
Institutional Animal Committees
The most controversial provision of the new Act, considered a major
legislative victory by many animal welfare groups, says "the Secretary shall
require that each research facility establish at least one [Institutional Animal]
Committee," 115 and that "at least one member is intended to provide represen-
tation for general community interests in the proper care and treatment of
animals." 116 Much store is placed in the Act's authorization that "[t]he Com-
mittee shall inspect . . . all animal study areas ...of such research facility
and review ... practices involving pain to animals and the conditions of animals
to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Act." 117 The Committee is
further directed to file an inspection certification reporting "any violation of
the standards promulgated ... by the Secretary, including any deficient condi-
tions of animal care or treatment." 118
Many people feel that the placement of an outside "humane" person on
the Committee will substantially reduce the frequency of animal abuse in
laboratory experiments. Dr. McCardle, in supporting the appointment of such
"' House Hearings, supra note 90, at 213 (statement of Christine Stevens, Society for Animal Protective
Legislation).
112 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 133 (statement of John McCardle, Humane Society of the United States).
13 Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1752(a), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1646.
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a member, said "I believe it will be difficult to hide a lack of inspections or
to hide serious violations of the Animal Welfare Act when a responsible member
of the local humane community is on the animal care committee." "9
Dr. Barbara Orlans, Executive Director of the Scientists Center for Animal
Welfare, spoke more emphatically about the importance of the Institutional Ani-
mal Committee: "These Committees are a key link in the review process that
sets the standard for humaneness of animal experiments. An effective institu-
tional committee can profoundly influence the welfare of animals kept for re-
search." 120
Still another witness at the Hearings, Dr. Herbert Rackow of the Scien-
tists Group for Reform of Animal Experimentation, emphasized the crucial role
played by the outside Committee member. Said Dr. Rackow:
For the first time, [the Act] brings to the inspection committee an indepen-
dent, unpaid lay member, who is not affiliated with the research facility,
has no conflict of interest, and whose primary responsibility is to the welfare
of the animal subjects, not to NIH and not to the USDA. The effectiveness
of [the Act] in ensuring humane treatment of research animals, will stand
or fall on the quality of this member. 21
Such optimism that the outside "humane" members of Institutional Animal
Committees can substantially help in reducing the suffering of laboratory animals
is not shared by everyone. The United Action for Animals report on the ISLAA
graphically illustrates past failures of care committees to reduce or eliminate
the abuse of experimental animals, and notes that "Care committees [have not]
done anything to alleviate the suffering of animals here in the United States." 122
Let us look at some experiments done in U.S. laboratories which already have
care committees that review experiments in advance:
At Fort Sam Houston, Texas: Guinea pigs and rats were scalded over 50%
of their bodies to observe the effects of oxygen consumption, and goats were
burned with flames to observe the effects on breathing and oxygen consump-
tion.123
At the General Motors Research Laboratories, Warren, Michigan: Rab-
bits' chests were crushed to observe injuries including heart and lung rupture. 124
At the Division of Biological and Medical Research, Argonne National
1 19McCardle, supra, note 90, at 44.
120House Hearings, supra, note 90, at 161 (statement of Barbara Orlans, Scientists Center for Animal
Welfare).
121 House Hearings, supra, note 90, at 197, 198 (prepared statement of Herbert Rackow, Scientists Group
for Reform of Animal Experimentation).
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Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois: 216 beagles were exposed to whole-body irradia-
tion with gamma rays, 22 hours a day for life to calculate the lethal dose of
radiation.125
Although these examples severely impugn the worth of animal care com-
mittees, it is not known if the committees here included outside members in
the review process. Committees without external representation employ what
is known as the "peer review system," which has not been effective in protect-
ing animals. 26 Two dramatic examples of peer review failures are the Taub
monkey case, where a committee failed to condemn abominable conditions that
included monkeys suffering with open wounds from self-amputation, 27 and the
head injury lab at the University of Pennsylvania, which for thirteen years used
NIH funding to brutally abuse test monkeys, 28 without protest from any of four
committees that approved of "the research and methodology." 129
Perhaps the new committees will prove more effective than peer review
has been in protecting laboratory animals. What success they do have will more
likely result from organizing public opinion than influencing researchers. To
do this, however, committee members must inform their communities about
activities at research facilities. Are they free to do this under the new Act?
Possibly not.
Section 1754 of the new Act provides that "It shall be unlawful for any
member of an Institutional Animal Committee to release any confidential in-
formation of the research facility including any information that concerns or
relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work . . ." 10 and
that "it shall be unlawful for any member of such Committee to use or attempt
to use to his advantages, or to reveal to any other person, any information which
is entitled to protection as confidential information .... 131
For violating any of these provisions, a member is subject to removal from
the committee, a fine of up to one thousand dollars and up to one year's im-
prisonment if the violation is inadvertent, 32 and a fine of up to ten thousand
dollars and up to three years' imprisonment for a willful violation of the Act. 133
Although the Act became effective only in December of 1986 and the USDA
has yet to promulgate comprehensive regulations, Section 1754 is certain to
125/d. at 5.
126 Comment, supra note 47, at 406.
127 See supra note 68.
128 Comment, McDonald, supra note 47, at 406. Also see Pothier, Animal-Research Aid Cut Off at Penn,
Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985, at I-A, col. 1.
129Comment, McDonald, supra note 47, at 407.
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have a chilling effect on the enthusiasm with which "outside members" 1 34 in-
form the public until the courts determine precisely what disclosures are pro-
tected under the first amendment' 3 5 and what activities are precluded from
disclosure under these provisions. Furthermore, Section 1752's express refusal
to authorize USDA regulation of the performance of "actual research," 136
together with co-sponsor Brown's asserted aim to limit the burden on research-
ers,13 7 suggest a legislative intent that will discourage courts from granting outside
committee members expansive freedom to inform under Section 1754.
This caveat represents a cautious interpretation of the potential strength
of the Act's confidentiality provisions. Few supporters raised this issue during
hearings on the bill. However, testifying against the bill, Howard C. Brown,
Jr., representing the National Association of Life Sciences Industries, Inc.,
recognized that the statute might "chill" outside committee members. He stated,
"The nonassociated community member .. is placed in an awkward posi-
tion. The individual does not enjoy the rewards or benefits of employment but
would be exposed to . . . the possible risks . . . of fines and imprisonment
for the release of confidential information." 138
Duplication in Experiments
The ISLAA requires that "[tihe Secretary shall establish an information
service at the National Agricultural Library [(NAL)]," 139 and that this service,
in cooperation with the National Library of Medicine (NLM), shall "provide
information . . . which could prevent unintended duplication of animal ex-
perimentation." 140 This sounds like an impressive step toward eliminating
duplicative research but these institutions need operating funds to effectively
"provide information."
The Reagan administration has zero-budgeted the AWA, which now includes
the ISLAA, for several years now. Last year "Congress voted 4.865 million
dollars as it has aone for the past five years despite attempts to reduce funding
in the President's budget." 141 Critics claim, however, that no real reduction
in duplicative testing can occur without establishing a more comprehensive
134 See Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1752(a), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1647, wherein the statute defines
what has come to be known as an "outside member" of the Committee as someone who "shall not be
affiliated in any way with such facility other than as a member of the Committee (and who) is intended
to provide representation for general community interests
...U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1752(a), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1646.
'37United Action for Animals, supra note 83, at 1.
138 House hearings, supra, note 90, at 68 (statement of Howard C. Brown, National Association of Life
Sciences Industries).
139 Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1752(a), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1648.
1'40Id.
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computer-based bibliographic service than that called for in the present Act.
Toward that end, Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-New Jersey) introduced
the "Information Dissemination and Research Accountability Act," 141 which
would have established a National Center for Research Accountability to pre-
vent duplicative experimentation or testing on live animals. "The bill mandate[d]
the use of modern technologies for the dissemination of biomedical informa-
tion to all of the nation's medical libraries for ready and economical use of
the researchers." 43 The bill anticipated a computer network far greater in scope
than that called for in the ISLAA, with a projected cost of millions of dollars,
and did not pass. Torricelli, however, has reintroduced a more modest bill of
the same name with a more realistic hope of passage in the 100th Congress.
44
Uncertain funding is not the only bar to an effective reduction in duplicative
testing. Even if the NAL information service succeeds in making data readily
available to researchers, the new Act calls for information to prevent "unintend-
ed" duplication and many scientists are unwilling to rely on data derived from
past studies. The American Institute of Biological Sciences' statement to the
House reveals the reluctance of researchers to rely on such information. Said
the report, 'As scientists, we are disturbed by an attitude which would discourage
'research duplication' since replicability by other investigators is our only means
of verification." "45 Despite these difficulties, the service created under the Act
should eliminate some duplication, and save many animals from suffering and
destruction.
Alternatives to Animal Experiments
Technological advances are enabling researchers to conduct a growing
number of experiments in which live subjects are no longer required. Advocates
of alternative research consider this a laudable and necessary development.
Dr. McCardle's testimony before the House strongly supported this position:
"I want to stress the importance of the alternative information center at the
NAL. . . many people in the research community are not aware of the extent
to which alternatives are available .... So I want to emphasize the importance
of this section." 146
Other scientists are more emphatic in their support of alternative research.
In a statement to Congressional appropriations committees, Dr. Richmond C.
Hubbard, Chairman of the Medical Research Modernization Committee, had
142 H.R. 1145, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
14 3United Action for Animals, Update on H.R. 1145, (undated), at 1.
'
44 H.R. 1708, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
145 House Hearings, supra, note 90, at 260 (prepared statement of The American Institute of Biological
Sciences).
1'6 House Hearings, supra, note 90, at 45 (statement of John McCardle, Humane Society of the United States).
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this to say:
[T]he "animal model" of research into human diseases and behavioral prob-
lems has been largely rendered obsolete by the "tremendous advances in
radiology, laboratory and computer sciences, cell and culture techniques.
. . IDlata obtained from human study is directly relevant . . . whereas
that obtained from "animal model" study is often irrelevant, wasteful, redun-
dant, and a hindrance rather than an aid to progress.
47
In the new Act's introduction, Congress found that "methods of testing
that do not use animals are being . . . developed which are faster, less expen-
sive, and more accurate than traditional animal experiments for some pur-
poses." 148 Consistent with these findings, the Act requires that "[elach research
facility shall provide for the training of . . . personnel involved with animal
care and treatment [and that] such training shall include instruction on...
research or testing methods that minimize or eliminate the use of animals." 149
Congress apparently agreed with doctors McCardle and Hubbard, as the NAL
duplication provisions also call for information "which could reduce or replace
animal use." 150
Furthermore, "Animal Testing Alternatives" is a new heading appearing
for the first time in 1985 editions of the National Library of Medicine's catalogs
and computer bases. The heading will be used to index materials that describe
procedures used to avoid experimentation with animals. Dr. George J. Cosmides,
Deputy Associate Director for Specialized Information Services, NLM, reports
that "[tlhe . . . description . . . includes 'procedures such as tissue culture,
mathematical models, etc., when used or advocated for use in place of the use
of animals in research or diagnostic laboratories." 151
While attempts to promote alternatives to animal use are proving successful
in certain areas, numerous representatives of the research community warn
against placing too much faith in the future of alternative research. The American
Heart Association statement concerning the alternative research provisions of
the new Act states:
Biomedical research is a key element in the overall mission of the Associa-
tion to "reduce ... disease." The death rates due to cardiovascular disease
have decreased . . . since 1968. Many . . . discoveries which . . . allow
these dramatic declines in morbidity . . . can be traced to . . . research
involving studies with animals. 152
The American Institute of Biological Sciences also voiced concern that
some critics of live animal studies are unrealistically optimistic in their ex-
i47R.C. Hubbard, Statement to Congressional Appropriations Committees, (undated), at 1.
'4Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1751, Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1645.
149Id. at 1648.
150 Id.
"'Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 80, at 2.
'52 House Hearings. supra note 90, at 252, 253 (prepared statement of the American Heart Association).
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pectations concerning the usefulness of computer modeling, cell cultures, and
other substitutes for live animals." 153
Dr. Van Hoosier's statement to the Subcommittee was militantly guarded
on the question of alternatives:
While adjunct methods have been developed in recent years ... fundamental
elements of biomedical research will always require the use of animals.
We do not believe the word "alternatives" is reasonable. It is not fair nor
accurate to hold out the promise that there are - or will be - research
substitutes for animals.' 54
While it is usually the animal rights activists who are accused of passionate
moral claims in this debate, Dr. William F Raub, Deputy Director of Extramural
Research and Training at the NIH, testified at the 1983 Senate Hearing that
"the NIH regards animal experimentation as both a legislative mandate and
a moral imperative." 55
It is interesting to note that opinions on the value of alternative research
correlate almost directly with each scientist's support or opposition to the Bill.
Both sides give persuasive arguments, with the pro-experimenters claiming that
even if we do find effective alternatives to the use of animals, the alternative
methods must first be tested on animals. The animal protectionists obviously
contest the logic of that paradoxical premise. Such philosophical nuance dims
in importance if the modest but hard-won legislative victories of the protec-
tionists are not enforced at law. Let us then consider the record in this regard.
USDA: Regulation, Promulgation, and Enforcement
Section 1752 of the ISLAA orders, among other things, that "The Secretary
shall promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment,
and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors." 156
The USDA has always been responsible for regulation under the AWA,1
s7
however, and its past record will discourage those hoping for stringent regula-
tion. The USDA's attitude toward laboratory animals is clearly reflected in the
following example of Department conduct:
The vast majority of animals used in laboratory research are rats and mice. 58
"At the present time ... 85% of the 70 million laboratory animals killed an-
nually in United States research and testing facilities are excluded from any
153 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 260 (prepared statement of the American Institute of Biological
Sciences).
154 House hearings, supra note 90, at4l (statement of Gerald Van Hoosier, School of Medicine, University
of Washington).
"5Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 7 (statement of William F Raub, National Institutes of Health).
156 Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVII, sec. 1752(a), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1645.
1577 U.S.C. 2143(a).
1518 Office of Technology Assessment Project Staff, Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and
Education (1986), at 10.
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legal protection. We will accomplish little if [the Act] does not include these
voiceless and unprotected animals within its provisions." 159 Nevertheless, the
Secretary did exclude "birds, rats and mice, and horses .. " 160 from protec-
tive regulation under the AWA, even though the AWA defined "animal" to in-
clude "such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may determine is
being used, or is intended for use" 161 in research or testing. 62
After analyzing this exclusion, Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney for the
Library of Congress, concluded:
Because rats and mice are warm-blooded animals . if [the Secretary]
determines that a rat or mouse is being used for research . . . then
. .. such rat or mouse is an "animal". . . . The Act does not appear
to give the Secretary the discretion to determine that a warm-blooded animal
being used for research is not an "animal" for purposes of the Act. 163
...Thus, the Secretary's exclusion of rats and mice . . . appears to be
inconsistent with the language of the ... AWA and with Congress's intent
in enacting it.164
It would appear then that the regulation, as promulgated by the Secretary,
frustrates the policy that Congress sought to implement. 165 Such frustration,
however, is mild in comparison to that suffered by anyone who has ever looked
to the USDA for enforcement of the AWA.
Until now, the AWA has been "virtually ineffective," primarily because
of the USDA. 166 From the very beginning, the Department has been reluctant
to involve itself with enforcement of the Act. In a 1966 letter 67 to a Senate
Committee, the Secretary expressed the department's unwillingness to accept
its appointment as the enforcement body of the AWA: "there is a question as
159 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 148 (statement of John McAidle, Human Society of the United States).
1609 C.F.R. sec. l.l(n).
1617 U.S.C. sec. 2132(g).
6 2See H. Cohen, Two Questions Concerning the Animal Welfare Act, in Animal Legal Defense Fund,
Submission on Pain and Anesthesia with Reference to the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals
Act of 1985, Exhibition B, p. CRS-I n. 1 (1986), which explains that "the introductory comments publish-
ed by the Secretary upon promulgating the regulation do not discuss the basis for this exclusion." See
also 42 FED. REG. 31022.
163 Cohen, supr note 161, at CRS-1,2. Cohen's report then discusses the legislative history of the provi-
sion and concludes that the Secretary's exclusion of rats and mice from the definition of "animals" defeats
the intent of Congress in this regard. Cohen questions the legal validity of this policy and suggests that
the courts "must reject administrative constructions of the statute... that are inconsistent with the statutory
mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought...", as stated in Federal Election Commission
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981). Cohen believes that the exclu-
sion of coverage to rats and mice is "beyond the Secretary's statutory authority," supra note 161, at CRS-5.
'64Cohen, supra note 161, at CRS-4.
165Review of the USDA's behavior in administering the various provisions of the AWA can indeed reach
the bizarre. One is tempted to send a lapel button to the Secretary stating that "Rats are People Too!"
166Rikleen, Animal Rights, The Animal Welfare Act: Still A Cruelty to Animals, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 134 (1978).
167 Letter from Secretary of Agriculture, USDA as contained in S. REP. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2635.
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to whether it would not be desirable that [the] law ... in question be administered
by a Federal agency more directly concerned and having greater exper-
tise . .'." 168
In 1970, the USDA sought to be removed from its role as enforcement agency
under the AWA. This time, in a letter to the House, the Department wrote that
in the Department's opinion, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
was "the appropriate agency to administer such an activity." 169 In 1976, when
the House Report 70 on the proposed 1976 Amendments suggested strengthen-
ing the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to establish humane standards
for animal treatment, the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture
received yet another letter from the Department opposing enactment of the
Amendments and suggesting that "[tihere are available alternative measures
which can achieve many of the objectives of the bill." 71 The letter failed to
specify the alternatives. 172
These letters do not reveal an attitude conducive to aggressive enforce-
ment measures. Neither does the fact that in the USDA's first decade of regula-
tion under the AWA only two persons were prosecuted. 173 The Department's
opposition to improved regulations has continued. During the 98th Congress,
the Department's Enforcement Administrator testified against the ISLAA, claim-
ing that "the bill would be a duplication of effort [and] . . . will increase the
enforcement problems." 174 Additionally, Secretary John R. Block wrote one
more letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture. Secretary
Block again opposed passage of the ISLAA, and said that "proper care and
treatment and appropriate use of laboratory animals can be achieved under cur-
rent authorities." 175
The USDA's attitude toward enforcement has never changed. For exam-
ple, despite federal investigators' repeated criticism of facility conditions, and
the campus veterinarian's refusal to sign required AWA compliance forms for
1980 and 1983, the Department took no action against the University of California
at Berkeley until a local television expose aroused public concern. 76 Even then,
the Department did not file charges against the University until a local citizen's
group, Californians for Responsible Reseach, brought suit to force action. The
1681d. at 2643.
169 Letter from Office of the Secretary, USDA as contained in H. REP. No. 91-1651, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
3, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5105, 5106.
170 H. REP. No. 94-801, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 758.
'71 Id. at 767.
172Rikleen, supra note 165, at 136.
173 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Prosecutions
for Animal Welfare Violations [1966-1976] 2 (August 1976).
174House Hearings, supra note 90, at 25 (statement of Bert W. Hawkins, APHIS (USDA)).
1"House Hearings, supra note 90, at 16 (letter from USDA secretary John R. Block to E. (Kika) de la
Garza, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture).
176Comment, supra note 125, at 405.
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case involved culpable neglect; thousands of animals died due to repeated
malfunctions of the laboratory heating system. 17 7 The case typifies the Depart-
ment's continuing unwillingness to enforce the AWA.
If the Department's track record with the AWA doesn't raise doubts about
the USDA's attitude toward animals, consider its role in the notorious hot iron
branding debacle. In April, 1986, to maintain dairy prices by reducing the supply
of cattle, the government agreed, under the Dairy Termination Program,'7 8 to
buy approximately two million dairy cattle, most of which were to be slaughtered.
To avoid being swindled by farmers who might supply the Department with
lower-yield cattle than those originally purchased, the USDA required all farmers
whose bids were accepted to brand the government-purchased animals "on the
face with a hot branding iron." 179
Extraordinary protest arose in response to the USDA's requiring such a
torturous procedure. The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) advocated
prosecution, under various state statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals, of anyone
who proceeded with the hot-iron face-branding. The HSUS sued the USDA
in Federal District Court, 8 0 claiming that the Department could not require
such branding. The court agreed, and the USDA had to amend its regulation
to allow farmers the choice between hot branding and a relatively painless alter-
native, freeze-branding.' 8'
One must question the wisdom of appointing an agency to enforce federal
statutes designed to protect animals from pain and suffering, when that agency
legally mandates the torture of cattle.
At the controversial 1984 House Hearings on the proposed ISLAA, there
was one point on which almost everyone agreed: the USDA enforcement record
has been pathetic. The AWA is actually administered by the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA. When asked at the Hearings
if he felt the current enforcement budget was adequate, Mr. Bert Hawkins, Ad-
ministrator of APHIS, and understandably the only witness satisfied with his
department's performance, made an astute observation. After responding that
he considered the present budget adequate, he said, "all people's ideas of care
of animals won't be changed in a day. We could put an army of people out there
with an abundance of funds to support them, and we would still have infrac-
tions of the act." 182 While his observation is correct insofar as full compliance
17"A. ROWAN. OF MICE, MODELS. AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANIMAL RESEARCH 174,175 (1984).
178 Dairy Termination Program, see H.R. REP. No. 99-271 (1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, reprinted in
[1985] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1124-25, amended by 7 U.S.C. sec. 1446 (d)(3).
179 See USDA Notice LD-249 (1986), which provides that "all female dairy cattle must be branded with
a hot branding iron."
18O Humane Society of Rochester and Monroe county for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al v.
L)wg, CIV-86-307T (unpublished opinion of Judge Michael Telesca) (U.S.D.C. W.D.N.Y. 1986).
I81/d. at 15,16.
192Hawkins, supra note 173, at 26.
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is concerned, the overall enforcement record of APHIS is clearly quite poor.
Few others share Mr. Hawkins' belief that APHIS is sufficiently funded.
Dr. Geelhoed, cited earlier as an opponent of ISLAA, had some thoughts on
APHIS enforcement:
APHIS, the Government agency charged with the enforcement of these
acts, has rarely, if ever, been provided with sufficient resources to ensure
full compliance with the law... With only 6 of the 485 inspectors work-
ing full time in animal inspection, and the remaining inspectors devoting
only 6 percent of their time to that inspection . . . it is clear to us . . .
that agency should be significantly strengthened with increased appropria-
tions and direction." 183
In her testimony to Congress, Gretchen Wyler referred to a 1984 speech
against passage of the ISLAA by Ms. Franki Trull, Executive Director of the
Foundation for Biomedical Research. Ms. Trull had said that one reason the
AWA hasn't worked well is that the APHIS inspection program receives only
$4.8 million a year (which it did at that time). To quote Ms. Trull: "Let's face
it, that's an absolute drop in the bucket and, of course, they therefore have in-
spectors who are not trained under the same training program, who are not
necessarily qualfied to be in a research institution . . . I mean, we've got a
real problem." 184
Dr. Van Hoosier also pointed out the problem of inadequate funding and
its effect on AWA enforcement: "It is not difficult to find ways to significantly
improve the application of current standards . . . Little else would be needed
... than to provide APHIS with adequate funding annually. There are too few
inspectors, and too few of them able to devote themselves to the area of animal
welfare." 185
Finally, Dr. Loew tactfully voiced the same opinion: "I would like to
. . . assess . . . current APHIS enforcement of the AWA. In a word, it has
been uneven. The program suffers ... from a lack of adequate funds, a too-
small professional and technical staff ... and from internal legal support which
is stretched too thinly. 86
The USDA's questionable attitude toward enforcement, combined with in-
adequate funding and poorly trained inspectors has resulted in a situation where
13 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 47 (statement of Glenn Geelhoed, Association of American Medical
Colleges).
184 From speech by Mrs. Franki Trull, Executive Director of The Foundation for Biomedical Research,
Illinois, Jan. 31, 1984, as quoted in House Hearings, supra note 90, at 199 (prepared statement of Gretchen
Wyler, The Fund For Animals, Inc.).
185 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 128 (prepared statement of Gerald Van Hoosier, Jr., University of
Washington).
'
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"the laboratories have not really taken the USDA seriously ... the laboratories
have been able to just push USDA aside." 187
Because of the USDA's unwillingness or inability to adequately enforce
the law, it has been suggested that civil suits be made available to compel en-
forcement of the Act. The HSUS asked that the 1985 Amendments contain a
provision that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf or
on behalf of any animal protected by this chapter to compel the Secretary to
apply and enforce the provisions of this chapter," 188 and that "district courts
shall have jurisdiction ... to order the Secretary to take any action necessary
to apply and enforce the provisions of the chapter." 189 The suggestion was not
incorporated into the ISLAA.
A very similar suggestion has been made by the Animal Legal Defense
Fund, in an extensive set of proposed changes to the AWA (and ISLAA). The
Animal Legal Defense Fund advocates that a Citizens Enforcement Provision,
modeled after the Citizens Enforcement Provision of the Clean Water Act, 190
be included in the Act. 191 Like the HSUS proposal, this would allow citizens
to bring suit against the USDA to enforce violated provisions of the Act. Given
the USDA's enforcement history, the exclusion of a provision of this type con-
stitutes a major flaw in the AWA and its amendments.
Representatives Charlie Rose (D-N.C.) and Rod Chandler (R-Washington)
also introduced an Amendment 92 to the Animal Welfare Act which would have
given individuals and groups standing to sue the USDA directly for any failures
to enforce the Act. The bill failed to pass in either the 98th or 99th Congress,
but Rose has again introduced this legislation in the 100th Congress.
What then does one conclude? Are the new Amendments going to provide
additional protection for laboratory animals, or is the ISLAA, as some claim,
merely a paper lion aimed at appeasing interest groups and constituents? The
ISLAA contains too many thoughtful provisions, advocated by too many con-
cerned parties, authorizing too many safeguards for even its harshest critics
to argue that it will do no good whatsoever. There are weaknesses, it is true,
in various provisions that reflect the compromise between animal welfare ad-
vocates and those supporting unfettered and unsupervised research.
The stipulation, for example, that research protocol may exempt an in-
187House Hearings, supra 90, at 107 (statement of Christine Stevens, Society for Animal Protective
Legislation).
188 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 45 (statement of John McArdle, Human Society of the United States).
189 Id.
19033 U.S.C. 1365 (1982).
191 See S.A. Chambers, Professionals, News: Progressive Animal Welfare Society Newsletter, May, 1987,
at 3.
192H.R. 4535, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
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vestigator from administering anesthesia or painkillers to an animal, 93 indicates
that a great deal of discretion remains in the hands of the scientist and research
facility. Other provisions, however, requiring that the reason for withholding
anesthesia be explained in a report filed with the Institutional Animal Com-
mittee, 94 that the principal investigator must have considered alternatives to
this procedure, 95 and that a veterinarian must be consulted in planning the pro-
cedure and supervising post-surgical care,' 96 certainly provide the impetus for
greater protection than that found in previous legislation.
Similarly, the threat of criminal sanction for disclosing confidential
information 97 compromises the ability of the newly required committees to
effectively protect animals. Inevitable future suits, however, challenging ISLAA
restrictions on an outside member's right to inform, will clarify the members'
limitations and power. Their power may prove surprisingly expansive. Further-
more, the committees' authority to inspect facilities, 98 examine the condition
of the animals, 99 and file reports of violations with APHIS inspectors200 seems
certain to influence researchers. This inspection process, combined with per-
sonnel training programs called for in the Act,20 ' should have a salutary effect
on the future treatment of laboratory animals.
Law finds compromise among competing interests. It seeks a workable
world. It cannot resolve conflicts to the complete satisfaction of all involved.
There are disapproving parties at both ends of the laboratory animal controversy,
who think the new law is terrible. Animal rights advocates consider the Act
gratuitous falderal while scientists condemn it as a serious impediment to
research. Nevertheless, the ISLAA holds out at least the promise of improved
conditions for laboratory animals. For this to happen, however, the Act must
be enforced.
Enforcement is the crucial link between the new Act and reduced suffer-
ing for laboratory animals. The ISLAA will lend no greater protection to animals
than past Amendments of the AWA unless the USDA is more rigorous in its
enforcement policy. The Department hasn't been vigilant in the past, however,
and there are no substantial reasons to hope for change. Current House Resolu-
tion 1770202 (the present version of Congressman Rose's Amendment to the
Animal Welfare Act), authorizing citizen suits to enforce provisions of the AWA,









20 2H.R. 1770, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
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would help. However, the bill is currently in committee; no hearings are sched-
uled; and no co-sponsorship of a companion bill in the Senate has been forth-
coming.
For many people opposed to unnecessary animal suffering, hoping for the
eventual passage of legislation with questionable odds of adequate enforcement
will no longer suffice.
As Dean Loew of the Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine said
at the House Hearings on the ISLAA, "in controversy, where you stand depends
on where you sit." 20 3 (Loew argued the case for a moderate middle ground
in shaping the new Act.) 20 4 From where many animal rights activists sit, the
need exists to take a stronger stand.
On April 24, 1987, a coalition of animal activists organized the largest
demonstration ever held on behalf of animals in commemoration of World Day
for Laboratory Animals.20 5 The event drew thousands of activists from some
thirty states to demonstrations, debates, "teach-ins," and acts of civil disobe-
dience in protest against the use of animal subjects in laboratory experiments.20 6
The Congress adopted Loew's advice in drafting the ISLAA and adopted
a bill it considered to be cautious, responsible, and effective. Whether or not
the new legislation will in fact prove beneficial to laboratory animals, only time
and the courts can tell. Meanwhile, experiments utilizing animal subjects will
continue and researchers themselves will exercise the greatest control over the
fate of laboratory animals.
Another federal law, The Health Research Extension Act (HREA) of 1985,207
requires the establishment of animal care committees (like those created by
the ISLAA) at all facilities that conduct behavioral and biomedical research
with animals and receive Public Health Service (PHS) funding.20 8 The Direc-
tor of the National Institutes of Health (the branch of the PHS which actually
awards federal research grants) is "empowered under the HREA to suspend
or revoke funding if violations of the act are found and not corrected. [This
Act] puts the force of federal law behind certain elements of the PHS policy." 209
However, only the most flagrant violators of NIH policy ever have their fun-
203House Hearings, supra note 90, at 38 (statement of Franklin Loew, Tufts University School of Veterinary
Medicine).
204Id. In arguing here for a moderate approach to legislation, Loew said, "Those who come today to talk
about total vivisection or, on the other hand, about bureaucratic big brother watching us, will have to
look elsewhere, not here. Such extreme and unacceptable approaches should never . . . be considered
by Congress."
2 5L. Pardue and B. Swart, World Day for Laboratory Animals - 1987, THE ANIMALS' AGENDA,
July/August 1987, at 10,11.
2 0 6 
1d.
207 HEALTH RESEARCH EXTENSION ACr OF 1985, P.L. 99-117 (1985), 42 U.S.C. sec. 289 (West Supp. 1986).
20 See National Institutes of Health, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (1985).
209Office of Technology Assessment Project Staff, supra note 26, at 23.
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ding suspended, 210 and the NIH enforcement record is not much better than
USDA regulation under the AWA and the ISLAA.
Given this reality, at least for the time being, ethical decisions of research-
ers, particularly academic and corporate researchers, will affect the lives of
laboratory animals to a far greater extent than the law, and it would behoove
us to consider the application of business ethics to the realm of corporate (and
academic) 2 11 research.
BUSINESS ETHICS
The analysis of business ethics does not lend itself to scientific verifica-
tion. One may have strong opinions, intuitive leanings, and beliefs, but cer-
tainty cannot exist. The same may be said, however, of the law, as it attempts
to create workable compromises among irreconcilable differences, and yet we
promulgate concrete guidelines for acceptable conduct. The traditional debate
in the realm of business ethics is whether or not the corporation has a social re-
sponsibility.
The most noted advocate of the "business has no responsibility other than
to maximize profits for its shareholders" school is the Nobel Laureate, Dr. Milton
Friedman. Yet even he suggests that "business make as much money as possi-
ble while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied
in law and those embodied in ethical custom." 212 The express modifiers in this
quote render the "profits only maxim" something else again. Friedman is by
no means suggesting that no moral curbs exist on the corporation's pursuit of
profit. He expressly delimits that pursuit by parameters in law and ethical societal
custom. The question of corporate ethics and responsibility is far more com-
plicated than it appears at first glance. By way of example, let us further analyze
Friedman's statement.
To begin with, he suggests that the company make as much money as possi-
ble. Assumedly, that is in accordance with the agency theory of corporate man-
agement 213 which suggests that the policy-making executives and board members
are merely agents of the stockholding principals, and therefore employees of
2 1
°See Pothier, Animal Research Aid Cut offat Penn, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985, at I-A, col.
I. The article explains how stolen videotapes showed researcher cruelty toward monkeys in a head injury
laboratory that, nevertheless, had received thirteen years of funding from the NIH. See also Delgado &
Francione, Controversy at the University of Pennsylvania, ANIMAL L. REP., winter 1984-85, at 4; Univer-
sit, of Pennsylvania Head hijury Lab Closed, ANIMAL L. REP. Summer/Fall 1985, at 6.
211 The intense competition for grant moneys in academic research and the direct relationship between
obtaining grant moneys, publishing articles based on the research conducted with that grant money, and
increases in faculty salary and rank, lend much credence to the assumption that academic research now
is business research.
212 M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE. Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
213See C.D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975), at
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the principals. Friedman appears to agree with this theory: in the same inter-
view in which he made the above remarks, he also said, "[t]he key point is
that... the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation." 214
If that is the case, however, the agent's responsibility is not necessarily
to always maximize profits but rather to fulfill the wishes of his principal, who
may desire different ends from his corporate manager-agent. Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of Dow's manufacture of napalm during the Vietnam War era.
If Dow viewed itself as the agent of the stockholding principals, the company
would gladly have provided the stockholders with an opportunity to let their
views on this company policy be heard. However, "like most major companies
faced with shareholder requests to include 'social action' measures on proxy
statements, [Dow] fought the proposal tooth and claw." 215
It appears then that many policy-makers only believe in the agency theory
when it concurs with corporate profit maximizing goals. This concurrence may
be quite frequent, however, because most shareholders like to see a profit, and
corporate policy-makers are frequently major shareholders as well.
The next thing to consider is that Friedman says the profit maximization
effort should conform to rules of law. This may not be very limiting, however,
if the corporation's power has been used to mold the very law it must follow.2 16
It would be ludicrous to suggest, for example, that the transportation industry
did not once dominate the regulatory scheme of the ICC, at least insofar as
rate scheduling was concerned. 217 The agency set fixed fees for the industry;
the fees were higher than those which the companies could have demanded
in an unregulated competitive market. It does not automatically follow that some
immoral, collusory relationship existed between the agency and the corpora-
tions being regulated. Rather, such results arise from the government-industrial
context within which agencies regulate. The corporations are the de facto pro-
mulgators of agency regulations simply because the corporations have more
expertise than the government bureaucrats.
214 See Friedman, supra note 95, at 33.
2t 5 See STONE. supra note 96, at 83 (quoting S.P. Sethi, Dow Shalt Not Kill, in UP AGAINST THE COR-
PORATE WALL (1971), at 236.
216 See STONE. supra note 96, at 94. Stone suggests that corporate influence on lawmaking is nothing new.
"The whole history of commercial law is one in which, by and large, the 'legislation' has been little more
than an acknowledgement of rules established by the commercial sector, unless there are the strongest
and most evident reasons to the contrary." Id.
217 See R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970):
[T]he ICC has set longevity records in its systematic failure to protect or further the public interest. Long
ago, the ICC found itself surrounded by a special interest constituency that viewed the agency as an oppor-
tunity for protection from competition and for insulation from consumer demands. Id. at vii. [Tihe ICC
acts aggressively to enforce monopoly power pricing ... it does not even pretend to consider the benefits
. . . for all concerned. The benefit, of course, is lower rates, increased incentive for greater efficiency
in transportation and ... lower commodity prices ... [Mionopoly gouging of shippers is not only pro-
moted, but required by the ICC - particularly where the shippers are able to pass the cost on to the
consumer. Id. at 144-146. Although these passages were written in 1970, many transportation experts argue
that nothing has changed at the ICC.
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Another theory in business ethics is known as the "stakeholder maxim." 218
This theory suggests that, in our capacity as commercial operants, we assess
the costs suffered by persons not party to our business transactions. This pro-
posed ethic asks the corporation to assume far greater responsibility for its con-
duct than the law would demand.
If A contracts with B to manufacture product C and a byproduct of that
manufacturing process is toxic waste D, leaving aside questions of existing en-
vironmental regulation, has not the negative effect of this legal transaction on
the public at large removed the situation from a private realm encompassing
only parties A and B? Even if we include the environmental regulation variable,
is not part of the corporate cost of meeting such regulations passed on to the
public? We still have consequences which remove the process from the realm
of private contract. The law is not equipped to handle all of these complex
variables that arise in the modern technological state.
"More and more, the major problems falling to the courts to decide are
. . . "polycentric issues' - issues characterized not only by their technical
complexity, but by their impact on large and diverse groups of people, far beyond
the parties immediately represented in court." 219 And if the courts cannot ade-
quately handle these polycentric issues, we must look elsewhere for appropriate
guidelines for corporate social conduct. This leads us back to the last point
in Friedman's remarks: that we must conform to the basic rules of society em-
bodied in ethical custom as well as law.
Ethical customs change and society today shows growing recognition of
an "environmental ethic." 2 2 0 In its barest form, this concept suggests that both
the environment and its nonhuman animal populus have a value of their own
and that the public at large is entitled to appreciate that value. This ethic precludes
a corporate right to irreparably damage that environment or its animal inhabitants
without compelling justification. Business as usual is not an ethically substan-
tial reason; nor is the claim that "it was legal." Moral restraints are usually
more stringent than legal ones. A responsible manager will inform himself about
the consequences of his business actions. Should he find the opportunity to
make corporate gains through legal but environmentally detrimental conduct,
he may please the stockholders and pass muster with the courts, but he will
not necessarily have acted in a morally responsible manner.
To avoid responsibility, decision-makers sometimes hide behind the com-
plexities involved in corporate decision-making. Certainly a manager must make
decisions that involve myriad potential consequences, and the process is not
218See H. Rolston, Just Environmental Business in JUST BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 326.
2 19 See STONE. supra note 96, at 106 (quoting Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial - Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972)).
220 See T. REGAN, supra note 6, at 184-203, for a detailed discussion of environmental ethics. See also
DILL, DONALDSON, & OrHERS, A SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS; AN INITIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980).
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made easier by the need to please shareholders. Such difficulties, however, do
not excuse one from individual responsibility. Philosopher John Ladd refers
to "the moral demands made of corporate managers as individuals and the
decision-making imperatives that a purely market-based ethic imposes on them
in their work life . . . as moral schizophrenia." 22 1
Such moral schizophrenia is a plight with which we can all sympathize
but it does not excuse the manager from imposing his individual morality upon
his corporate policy-making, at least in certain instances. Surely, where a cor-
porate decision will cause undeserved harm to others or irreparable damage
to the environment, it becomes the manager's moral imperative to make his
individual responsibility the business ethic of the firm. If it is so readily ac-
cepted that corporations have responsibilities as legal entities that roughly ap-
proximate those of individual entities, is it outrageous to suggest that they should
also be bound by a business ethic that coincides with accepted individual moral
principles?
Corporations do not exist in a vacuum. Management should extend moral
judgments through the whole event in which their business plays a part.222 As
philosopher Holmes Rolston III has said, "[T]he scope of judgement should
not stop at the boundaries of [a] business. . . . Ethical judgement needs to reach
for the compound unit. . . . We might formerly have thought that the relevant
unit to consider was merely the company and its customers . . . [but now] it
needs to be society, the country, the global Earth!"1223
In this increasingly complex and technologically sophisticated world, ethical
issues become more difficult to resolve as the universe of relevant consequences
continually expands. Having suggested that the sophisticated "polycentricity"
of issues a manager faces today calls for policies that respond to more than
the corporation's immediate fiscal and legal concerns, let us briefly examine
the question of corporate responsibility toward laboratory animals.
Few people concur with Descartes' minimalist position described earlier,
that animals are without consciousness. While some people think the only human
responsibility toward animals is to not demean one's moral stature by perpetrating
acts of cruelty upon them, the vast majority of us agree with Bentham that
animals can indeed suffer and therefore have some interests, however minimal,
that oblige us as moral agents to fulfill some obligations toward them.
Perhaps Regan's concept of animal rights, founded upon the idea that
nonhuman creatures have inherent value which makes them moral patients, is
too unorthodox or novel a concept for the average citizen in a technologically
221 See K. Goodpaster, The Concept of Corporate Responsibility, in JUST BUSINESS, supra note 21, at
317 (quoting J. Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 THE MONIST.
1970, at 488.
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advanced western society to accept. Most of us, however, think animals are
capable of some discernment and preference and therefore possess some in-
terests. Even if we do not extend the sphere of these interests so far as to say
that animals have rights, there is something akin to a cultural consensus that
animals, at least the more advanced mammals, should not be subjected to con-
duct detrimental to their interests, without a morally legitimizing reason.
In short, attributing the most conservative philosophical position to our
culture, consistent with the way in which we view animals and our relation-
ship toward them, our society adopts a utilitarian construct in searching for
guidelines for our treatment of animals (or, more likely, a justification for the
way in which we do treat them). In that context, we cannot ethically justify
subjecting animals to fear, pain, suffering, and death, unless their misfortune
serves to provide a greater good for the larger society. Otherwise, we say they
have no interests, and by implication, cannot suffer, a position the vast majori-
ty of us, on the bases of observation, scientific inquiry, and common sense,
simply do not accept. Individually then, we can only justify the use of animals
in experiments when such use will provide measurably greater benefit to society
at large than the suffering the animals undergo.
Using either the conservative Friedman's view of limitations on corporate
license being found in cultural ethics, or the more expansive environmental
concept which extends business responsibility to the entire eco-system, cor-
porations operate outside any code of acceptable business ethics when they con-
duct experiments on animals that do not result (or at least promise to result)
in more societal good than the collective harm they impose on their animal
subjects. Let us look then at the types of research that utilize animal subjects.
There are six basic categories of research that employ animal subjects:
Educational experiments (such as physiology classes), military experiments (such
as gunshot wound experiments on live animals), cosmetic products testing,
household products testing, psychological behavioral testing, and biomedical
research. The educational experiments do not directly relate to corporate ac-
tivity in laboratories. (Many corporations breed animals solely for experimen-
tal use, which certainly raises ethical questions. However, such breeding is
beyond the scope of this review). 224 Military experiments on animals, while
morally questionable, also fall outside the purview of this analysis. The other
four types of experiments are quite commonly carried out in corporate
laboratories. Are they useful?
224Charles River Breeding Laboratories, for example, is the largest breeder of laboratory animals in the
world. "The company was recently acquired by Bausch & Lomb for $135 million in stock. . .Charles
River has always tried to present itself as a major contributor to crucial medical research. Time Magazine
gave a more accurate view ...when it wrote of Charles River in 1980, '[t]his year the company will
dispatch more than 18 million of its well-bred rats, mice, hamsters, guinea pigs, rabbits and monkeys to
research labs throughout the world, where in the name of science the creatures will debauch themselves
gobbling saccharin, lushing liquor, and inhaling cigarette smoke'" T. Soos, Charles River Breeding Labs,
THE ANIMALS' AGENDA, Dec. 1986, at 42.
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Psychological behavioral experiments are frequently conducted by both uni-
versity and corporate laboratories that receive federal funding for accepted proj-
ects (usually from the NIH).225 Two common experiments are deprivation tests
and drug dependency tests. In the former, young animals, often baboons or
monkeys, are taken from their mothers, frequently permanently. The animals
are studied to determine the effects of such deprivation on their mental states.
What for? The researchers justify using animals in such experiments by
assuring us of their complete lack of similarity with humans, and then attempt
to equate the psychological response of an infant monkey to that of a human.
Many of the infants become so deranged that they repeatedly bang their heads
against the cages (to which they are sometimes confined for life) or chew off
their own limbs.
The latter experiment often involves addicting animals to cocaine or alcohol
to study the addicted animals' conduct. Again, what for? Surely a study of all
the alcoholics and cocaine addicts we are spending millions of dollars to cure
would provide more useful results than experiments on monkeys. But the ex-
periments on monkeys are more readily funded by government agencies.
Psychological behavorial testing on animals is one instance in which the utilitarian
calculus can be easily interpreted. The benefits of these experiments, if any,
do not justify the suffering of their animal subjects.2 26
Cosmetic testing was discussed earlier and the Draize test, in which cosmetic
compounds are dropped into the eyes of restrained rabbits, was used as an ex-
ample of utilitarian mathematics insisting upon a justification of the research-
er's conduct. The animal subjects are harmed, as Regan suggests, not
metaphorically, but in that they are actually "made to endure what is detrimental
to their welfare, even death." 227 But what is the justification here? All cosmetic
testing serves human vanity at a cost of incalculable suffering and millions of
innocent animals' lives.
Household product testing often involves the LD-50 test.228 This is one
225 It is difficult to determine precisely how much NIH funding goes toward animal research but the sum
is substantial. See L. Thompson, NIH and the Politics of Disease, The Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, Feb. 16, 1987, at 6,7,8. The NIH, which started in 1887 with an annual budget of $300, now, ac-
cording to Thompson, spends more than $6 billion a year, $3.5 billion of which is allocated as annual
research grants to educational institutions, governmental agencies, and private corporations, all of whom
use a considerable portion of this money to conduct research with animal subjects. See also Dresser, Research
On Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory Reform, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153 (1985), (quoting Rowan
& Rollin, Animal Research - For and Against: A Philosophical, Social, and Historical Perspective, 27
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. i, at 21 (1983), stating that the NIH and other federal agencies contribute over
$6 billion annually to biomedical research in the United States. The comparative figures are quite close
so it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. Whatever the precise amount spent on research with animal
subjects may be, it is certainly a formidable figure.
226 See A. Bond, Ethical Reservations About Psychological Research with Animals, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
RECORD (1980), at 201-210, for a more detailed critique of psychological behavioral testing on animals.
227See T. REGAN. supra note 27, at 96.
22 8The LD-50 test is severely criticized by both researchers and animal protectionists. Consider the state-
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of the most inhumane procedures in all of laboratory testing. Massive doses
of household products, such as detergent or paint, are sprayed down the sub-
ject's throat (frequently rabbits), until half of the test animals die. The ex-
periments are supposed to establish the lethal doses of the various products.
However, the animals frequently die of ruptured intestines, pain, or asphyxia-
tion, rather than from toxic doses of the product being tested.
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment calls this "[o]ne of
the oldest and . . . least sophisticated tests,"' 229 and adds that "[s]cientists
• . . have criticized it in recent years, in part because it cannot be extrapolated
reliably to humans, and in part because the imposition of a highly toxic or lethal
dose seems particularly inhumane." 230
The Food and Drug Administration, which used to require administration
of the LD-50 test, no longer does, and the Environmental Protection Agency
has defined circumstances where the LD-50 test can be replaced by an alter-
native.231 However, thousands of companies continue to use the test, allegedly
to avoid products liability suits. If that is true, it is a tragic cost in lives due
to a lack of information. As Laurence S. Clootz, an insurance executive, has
said, "Insurers . . . do not know much about the products being produced.
They will expect the industry to test their products, and live animal testing is
the routine. Until the insurance . . . industry is alerted to the inadequacy of
live animal testing and the waste in time, money and life it causes, there will
be no real changes in the position of industry." 232
Various alternatives to live animal testing are available. In vitro testing and
computer modeling are two proposed alternatives to the Draize Test and the
LD-50 Test. Additionally, there are other alternative methods of testing that
could replace much animal experimentation, including mathematical models,
patient models, cell cultures, organ cultures, the Ames test (which uses
salmonella bacteria to test for toxicity and carcinogenicity), gas chematography,
mass spectrometry, and clinical and epidemiological studies.233 According to
a report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment entitled "Alter-
natives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education," 234 there are both
ment of a Swiss author who calls the LD-50 test "a crude hit and miss procedure, and scientists everywhere
have expressed doubts about its validity . . . [Allthough clumsy to the point of being grotesque, it is the
only system the scientists have been able to devise for establishing toxicity and irritability." H. RUESCH,
SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENT (1978), at 115,116. See also M. Balls, R. Riddell, & A. Worden (eds.),
ANIMALS AND ALTERNATIVES IN TOXICITY TESTING (1983); H. Spira, Fighting to Win, in IN DEFENSE OF
ANIMALS (P. Singer ed. 1985), at 204, 205; A. ROWAN. ALTERNATIVES To LABORATORY ANIMALS DEFINI-
TIONS AND DISCUSSIONS (1980).
129 See Office of Technology Assessment Project Staff, supra note 26, at 14.
231d. at 15.
231 Id. at 31.
212 Letter from Laurence S. Clootz to THE ANIMALS' AGENDA. March 1987, at 37.
233 See Note, Antinomy: The Use, Rights, and Regulation of Laboratory Animals, supra note 12, at 755,
for a more detailed discussion of available alternatives.
234 See Office of Technology Assessment Project Staff, supra note 26, at 13. The advantages listed include
[Vol. 21:2
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advantages and disadvantages in different tests. However, given the extent of
suffering that laboratory animals undergo, it is morally incumbent upon cor-
porations engaged in laboratory tests using animal subjects to seriously investigate
alternative methods of research.235 If the sole reason for using animal subjects
in testing household products is to avoid legal liability, then, considering points
raised earlier, it is arguable that with the possible exception of biomedical
research (which we shall consider next), none of these laboratory experiments
is morally justifiable.
Biomedical research is extremely complicated. However, many researchers
suggest that alternative methods in certain areas are equal to or more valuable
than experiments using live animal subjects.23 6 Experiments with animals in
those areas, however beneficial to mankind, are unacceptable in that they in-
volve the gratuitous imposition of great suffering.
Consider one other limitation on the use of animals in biomedical research.
What if the research does not result in substantial benefits to humans? For ex-
ample, has cancer research on live animals diminished human suffering or the
incidence of humans contracting the disease? Conventional wisdom suggests
that it is taboo to even consider such things. Yet, Dr. Irwin Bross,2 37 a leading
biomedical researcher, claims that cancer research on live animals is useless.
Dr. Bross argues that "[t]his slaughter can serve little or no scientific purpose
for mutagenic diseases (those caused by genetic damage) such as cancer. Hence,
serious ethical questions can be raised about the motives of agencies that grant
funds for performing this ritual, and of the physicians and scientists who ac-
cept money for fraudulent research." 238 Bross argues that mutagenetic diseases
cannot be studied outside the "host environment," the body in which the disease
is found, and that therefore, all studies of cancer in animals are useless in the
extrapolation of such studies to man. 239 Bross' opinions need not be taken as
factual, but they should be explored. Rigorous epidemiological and statistical
reduction in the number of animals used; reduction in animal pain and distress; savings in time and the
cost of research. Disadvantages listed include reduced ability to study organismal growth processes; reduced
ability to study behavior; reduced ability to study interaction between the organism and its environment.
2351d. at 21, explaining that Revlon has given $1.25 million to The Rockefeller University to support research
on alternatives to the Draize Test, and that the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Ass'n and Bristol Myers
Company have given $2.1 million to the Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing at The Johns Hopkins
University. This sounds impressive and should be commended, but given the revenues of these organiza-
tions and the expenditures they make on other research, the figures are not so impressive.
236 Medical Research Modernization Committee, Statement to Congressional Appropriations Committees
(undated). In the statement, committee chairman, Dr. R.C. Hubbard says, "the animal idea of research
into human diseases and behavioral problems has been largely rendered obsolete by the tremendous ad-
vances in radiology, laboratory and computer sciences, cell and organ culture techniques ... (Data) ob-
tained from 'animal model' study is often irrelevant, wasteful, redundant, and a hindrance rather than
an aid to progress."
2371. Bross, Animal Models: Fighting Cancer with a Failed Technology, THE ANIMALS' AGENDA. March,
1987, at 16.
238 1d. at 16.
219 Id. For more information on the use of animals in cancer research, see B. REINES. CANCER RESEARCH
ON ANIMALS: IMPACT AND ALTERNATIVES (1986); see also J. CAIRNS, CANCER: SCIENCE AND SOCIETY (1978).
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studies should be conducted by all parties engaged in biomedical research us-
ing animal subjects in order to assess the benefits, if any, that are being de-
rived from such research.
Both the utilitarian and "rights" principles "view the harming of an in-
dividual as presumptively wrong . . . ITihe burden of proof must always be
on those who cause harm to animals in scientific settings . . . [Ilt is not the
critics, it is the advocates of animal use in science who should bear [this
burden]." 240 If animals have some interests, then we in turn have some obliga-
tions toward them, and it is reasonable to assert that only medical research
with no available alternatives to the use of live animal subjects, and a high poten-
tial for providing substantial benefits to either humans or other animals, is ethical-
ly justifiable. Even in the few areas of research that meet these conditions, bona
fide efforts should be continually made toward finding alternative methods.
These conclusions could have a substantial effect on our culture and the
scientific corporate community. It is understandable that people have difficul-
ty relating to the unfamiliar ideas suggested here, but that does not negate the
validity of such concepts. Should one agree with even some of the ideas presented
here, it might necessitate changes in his or her view of our relationship to
animals, based on a new model of our moral obligations toward them.
Corporations are equally ethically bound to reconsider their relationship
to animals and make whatever policy changes such re-assessment might re-
quire. At the very least, corporations should terminate gratuitous and needlessly
repetitive testing, police their own laboratories to eliminate cruelty toward test
animals, 24' work with Congress and insurers for effective products liability
statutes that would eliminate the need for useless testing on animal subjects,
and actively fund and research alternative methods of testing. If corporate re-
searchers choose not to do this, their refusal will most likely be rooted in
economic rather than ethical considerations. And if corporations are no mole
than a collective reflection of our individual selves, this should serve as an
insightful gaze into our societal mirror.
CONCLUSION
We have moved past Descartes' minimalist view of the valuelessness of
animals. While the majority of our society could not accurately be classified
as animal rights activists (or even sympathizers), we construct (even if only
240 D. Jamieson & T. Regan, On the Ethics of the Use of Animals in Science, in THE USE OF ANIMALS
IN SCIENCE 191 (1986).
241 See Animal Abuse at Gillette Labs Exposed - International Boycott Called, THE ANIMALS, AGENDA.
December 1986, at 14, 15. The article describes videotape footage taken by a former Gillette employee,
allegedly showing LD-50 tests and overt acts of cruelty toward animal subjects. In a form letter (Jan. 19,
1987). Beverly J. Smart, Gillette Consumer Service Representative, denied any cruelty on the part of Gillette
researchers. (She did not deny that Gillette administers the LD-50 test, a test they previously claimed
had been discontinued at Gillette years ago.) It is interesting to note that although Gillette denies the allegations
aired in various international media, the company has brought no legal action against the accuser. This
is a notorious example of the alleged mistreatment laboratory animals are exposed to on a continuing basis.
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subconsciously) utilitarian models for employment in moral decision-making
that give growing weight or importance to animals as moral patients.
Although the jurisprudential parallel of "the" great artistic debate - does
art imitate life or vice versa (in this case does law imitate life or vice versa)
can never be fully resolved, it is safe to assume that law and life influence each
other and are synergistically involved in the evolution of our culture's moral fiber.
Law and ethics both play critical roles in society's advancement toward
a more caring treatment of animals. Insofar as the use of animals as laboratory
subjects is concerned, while we may never see the complete abolition of such
conduct, and we certainly shall not see it for a long time to come, we are see-
ing tangible evidence all around us of a growing sensitivity to the suffering
and interests (if not rights) of the nonhuman fellow travelers with which we
share this planet.
The ISLAA amendments to the Animal Welfare Act provide statutory proof
of our growing concern for the well-being of animals. The astute observations
of the bill's critics deserve consideration, as there are weaknesses in the legisla-
tion. The bill should have included more omnibus coverage of related provi-
sions that are now being raised in various bills pending in the Congress.
Most important of these is H.R. 1770,242 Congressman Rose's amendment
to the AWA (discussed earlier), which would allow citizens to sue the USDA
in cases where the AWA and the ISLAA are not being enforced. Given the
USDA's sketchy enforcement record in this area, H.R. 1770 would guarantee
more effective implementation of the new legislation.
Other provisions that should have been included in a broader ISLAA are
H.R. 1708,243 the Information Dissemination And Research Accountability Act,
sponsored by Congressman Torricelli (also discussed earlier), which would pro-
mote the dissemination of biomedical information through modern methods
of science and technology to prevent the duplication of experiments on live
animals, and H.R. 778,244 the Pet Protection Act, sponsored by Congressman
Robert Mrazek (D-N.Y.), which would prohibit the NIH from issuing research
grants to researchers using animals directly or indirectly acquired from animal
shelters.2 45 The ISLAA should also have incorporated the key provisions of H.
Con. Res. 19,246 the Draize Rabbit Eye Irritancy Test resolution, sponsored by
242 H.R. 1770, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
243 H.R. 1708, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
24 4H.R. 778, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
245 The Pet Protection Act is intended to eliminate pound seizure on a federal level. Pound Seizure is the
term applied to the sale by pounds and animal shelters of unclaimed animals to research laboratories for
experimental purposes. Many pounds are involved in accepting animals of "questionable" origin (mean-
ing stolen pets, to translate freely), for the purpose of profiting on the sale of such animals to research facilities.
246H.R. Con. Res. 19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Fall, 1987]
43
Hoch: Use of Laboratory Animals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Congressman Andy Jacobs (D-In.), and H:R. 1635,247 the Consumer Products
Safe Testing Act, sponsored by Congresswoman Barbara Boxer (D-Ca.), which
taken together would have essentially eliminated the use of the Draize and LD-50
tests from use in research conducted or sanctioned by any federal agencies.
Inclusion of these provisions in a more comprehensive ISLAA would have
lent greater guaranteed protection to the animals. Beyond that, the criminal
sanctions pertaining to inadvertent divulgence of trade secrets248 by members
of Institutional Animal care and Use Committee members should not have been
included in the new Act, as this provision can only serve to minimize public
awareness of laboratory treatment of animal subjects.
Nevertheless, the new law indicates a growing social awareness of our moral
obligations toward animals. While the Act is not as stringent in its application
or enforcement provisions as animal protectionists had hoped for, it at least
creates the possibility of better treatment of laboratory animals.
Ultimately, however, the law can only serve to mitigate injustices in a
system's treatment of its members; the ethical conduct that flows from an
understanding and compassionate heart is the greatest safeguard available to
the innocent and unprotected members of a society. Perhaps the growing con-
cern over animal welfare will lead to more truly protective legislation and a
more compassionate personal and commercial ethic in our relationship with
the animal kingdom. One can only fervently hope for such a result and for
it to come quickly, because the present laws and ethics as applied to laboratory
animals are subjecting millions of those pathetic creatures to a fate far worse
than death.
247H.R. 1635, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
24 8 Pub. L. 99-198, Title XVH, sec. 1754, Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1649.
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